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The 1936 Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act was
conceived in an atmosphere of hostility to the chain stores which sup-
posedly received discriminatory prices not available to their small
competitors.' Although the amendment creates a formidable array of
legal hurdles for buyers of any size or functional type, the legislative
history of the amendment negates any inference that Congress sought
to impose any rigid rule of caveat emptor on buyers subject to the Act.
Indeed the congressional intent to halt coercive practices2 of giant
buyers,3 which had an actual and visible impact on competition 4 was
* Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia.
' 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). The Act amends § 2 of the 1914
Clayton Act, which generally prohibited price discriminations in the sale of commodities
in interstate commerce "where the effect . .. may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
2 The whole legislative history of the Act is marked by frequent references to
coercion. See Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Dkt. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24-25 (1934); Remarks by Representative Patman, Hearings Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1935). See also the remarks by H. B. Teegarden before the same committee to the
effect that the bill is directed at the "use of that buying power to extract price con-
cessions, rebates, and differentials that are now warranted by any serving to the manu-
facturer." Id. at 15. (Emphasis added.)
3 The evils at which Congress sought to strike in amending the existing Clayton
Act were well summarized by Representative Wright Patman in the House debates on
the proposed amendment:
Mr. Chairman, there has grown up in this country a policy in business that a
few rich, powerful organizations by reason of their size and their ability to
coerce and intimidate manufacturers have forced those manufacturers to give
them their goods at a lower price than they give to the independent merchants
under the same and similar circumstances and for the same quantities of
goods.
80 Cong. Rec. 8111 (1936).
4 According to Representative Patman's keynote remark on the chain store problem:
[T]he day of the independent merchant is gone unless something is done quickly.
He cannot possibly survive under that system. So we have reached the cross-
roads; we must either turn the food and grocery business of this country ...
over to a few corporate chains or we have got to pass laws that will give the
people, who built this country in time of peace and who saved it in time of
war, an opportunity to exist ....
Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clay-
ton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935).
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translated into a series of prohibitions directed at sellers.5 Recognizing
the predatory nature of the practices at which the legislation was
directed, buyer's liability was created where unlawful discriminatory
concessions were received, but only where the buyer had actual knowl-
edge of the illegality of the concession.6
Because buyer's liability is based upon a showing that a seller has
violated a complex and imprecise statute and that the buyer knew of
this violation, the tests for liability of buyers present some of the most
difficult interpretative problems of the 1936 amendment.7 The heart of
the problem lies in the judicial and administrative treatment of the
crucial requirement of knowledge of illegality. Obviously, if the buyer
is required on pain of prosecution to beware of all price concessions
not accorded to competitors, a premium is placed on a tacit buying
price uniformity and withdrawal from vigorous competition. There
can be no dispute that such a standardization of buying prices is con-
trary to the statutory intent of the Robinson-Patman Acte and serves
no legitimate economic purpose. On the other hand, the predatory exac-
tion of illegal prices, with full knowledge of illegality, may result in
drastic competitive inequities favoring particular buyers.
On balance, it seems very clear that the purpose of the Act, to
restrict the predatory and knowing solicitation of illegal prices, while
allowing buyers to compete vigorously for price benefits which are not
illegal, can only be accomplished by a realistic administrative and
judicial appraisal of the buyer's actual knowledge of the legality of
the prices which he receives. In scope, this article seeks to review the
recent decisions and guidelines of the Federal Trade Commission and
the courts to determine whether this criterion of realistic appraisal has
been followed. The pivotal questions reviewed are:
1. Have the Federal Trade Commission and the courts laid down
concise rules of seller liability under the Robinson-Patman Act which
5 Rather than to strike directly at the practices of buyers, Congress sought to follow
the statutory pattern of § 2 of the 1914 Clayton Act which contained prohibitions
against sellers. According to the Final Report of the Chain Store Investigation, supra
note 2, at 24, these original provisions were critically defective because of a proviso
sanctioning discriminations because of differences in the quantities of sale.
6 Section 2(f) dealing with buyers was designed to facilitate resistance to "sacri-
ficial price cuts" by enabling a small buyer to fend off a predatory buyer by pleading
the illegality of his coercive demands. 80 Cong. Rec. 9419 (1936).
7 See Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 197 (1955), predicting that "many
complexities will attend full development of the buyer's liability."
8 The legislative history indicates clearly that the bill "does not authorize or con-
template price fixing." 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks by Senator Logan). See
also statement of Representative Summers. 80 Cong. Rec. 8110 (1936).
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are readily understandable by the buyer in his day-to-day operations?
2. What approach have the Federal Trade Commission and the
courts taken to the question of the buyer's actual understanding of
Robinson-Patman Act liability?
3. Has the pattern of enforcement adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission and the courts placed a premium upon tacit price uni-
formity or developed other competitive inequities?
At the threshold of these questions, the reader is invited to review
the burdens which the buyer faces as evidenced in the comprehensive
sweep of complex statutory prohibitions against sellers. In relevant
part, section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits a supplier
from discriminating in the prices accorded to his customers on goods
of "like grade and quality" where the effect of such discrimination may
be to substantially lessen competition.9 If the Commission proves these
facts in a 2 (a) proceeding, the seller may then establish a defense by
coming forward with evidence to establish that (1) he is meeting com-
petition in good faith; (2) the discriminatory price is cost justified; or
(3) the discriminatory price was "in response to changing conditions."10
While section 2 (a) is conditioned on a showing of competitive im-
pact, Congress adopted a test of per se illegality for particularized types
of discriminatory practices such as the granting of dummy brokerage
for which the buyer rendered no service, and advertising allowances
and services which were not available to all competitors on a propor-
tionally equal basis. There is no question that brokerage, advertising
allowances, and services were considered to be particularized vehicles
of price discrimination by Congress. 1
Section 2 (c) of the Act prohibits a seller from allowing brokerage
or discounts in lieu of brokerage to its customers in connection with
their purchases except when such allowances are given "for services
rendered."' 2 Section 2 (d) prohibits a supplier from according promo-
tional allowances to one customer when such allowances are not avail-
able to competing customers on a proportionally equal basis. 3 Section
2 (e) prohibits a supplier from according discriminatory services to one
customer when such services are not available to competing customers
on a proportionally equal basis.' 4
9 38 Stat. 730 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
10 See § 2(b) of the Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964), and § 2(a),
38 Stat. 730 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
"1 See Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Dkt. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24-28 (1934).
12 38 Stat. 730 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
13 38 Stat. 730 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964).
14 38 Stat. 730 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1964).
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While a comprehensive list of the types of discriminatory benefits
is enunciated in the sections applicable to suppliers, no such clarity is
found in the sections dealing with buyers. Section 2(f) of the Act pro-
hibits buyers from knowingly receiving discriminatory prices that vio-
late section 2 (a)."8 Section 2 (c) by its terms applies to both buyers
and sellers and hence prohibits a buyer's receipt of brokerage or dis-
counts in lieu of brokerage.16 However, no section of the Robinson-
Patman Act refers in any way to a buyer's receipt of discriminatory
promotional allowances or services which are not available to competi-
tors on a proportionally equal basis.
This then is the statutory background against which the question
of buyer's liability must be reviewed.
I. BUYER LmBinITY UNDER SECTION 2(f)
A. Section 2(f) and the Automatic Canteen Doctrine
Prerequisite to buyer's liability under section 2 (f) is a showing
that a seller has violated section 2 (a) and that the buyer knew of the
violation when he received the discriminating price.
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in the Automatic Can-
teen"7 case laid down clear and concise ground rules for the presenta-
tion of cases against buyers, delineating both the Commission's burden
of proof and the criteria for ascertaining the buyer's knowledge that
he was receiving illegal concessions.
Automatic Canteen Co. was engaged in leasing automatic vending
machines to distributors and in buying and reselling commodities to be
sold in those machines. The record in the administrative proceeding
showed that it had solicited and received prices which were as much
as one-third below those which its competitors paid. The Commission
held that proof that the seller had violated section 2 (a) plus evidence
that the buyer knew he was receiving a favored price was sufficient to
establish a violation. According to the Commission, when such evidence
was introduced, the burden of proving cost justification, or lack of
knowledge, was thrown on the buyer,"8
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Commission had the
original burden of presenting evidence to show (1) that the price
received was not cost justified and (2) that the buyer knew that it
was not cost justified or otherwise within the seller's defenses.' 9 While
15 38 Stat. 730 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964).
16 38 Stat. 730 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
37 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
18 46 F.T.C. 861, 896 (1950).
19 Supra note 17, at 79.
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the Court merely indicated that the original burden of going forward
with the evidence was on the Commission, the burden imposed by the
Court was in fact substantial. Thus, the Court stated that to demon-
strate a prima facie case the Commission need only show that the
buyer
knew that the methods by which he was served and quantities in
which he purchased were the same as in the case of his competitor.
If the methods or quantities differ, the Commission must only show
that such differences could not give rise to sufficient savings in the
cost of manufacture, sale or delivery to justify the price differential,
and that the buyer, knowing these were the only differences, should
have known that they could not give rise to sufficient cost savings. °
Thus, in a 2(f) proceeding, the Court flatly held that the
Commission must at the threshold prove that the price discrimination
"could not" be cost justified in a case where methods or quantities
differ. Moreover, the Court imposed a substantial burden on the Com-
mission in proving the buyer's knowledge of illegality. In reversing the
Commission decision against Automatic Canteen, it made clear:
1. that a buyer is not charged with notice of illegality merely be-
cause he knows that he is receiving a lower price than his competitors; 1
2. that a buyer is not charged with notice of illegality merely be-
cause he initiated the request and bargained for a lower price than that
given to his competitors;'
3. that a buyer is not charged with notice of illegality merely
because he did not obtain information demonstrating that the price he
received is justified before accepting that price.23
It is evident that the Automatic Canteen decision is based upon
the Court's careful evaluation of conflicting policy considerations and
its conclusion that section 2 (f) does not and should not embody any
doctrine of caveat emptor when a buyer is charged with receipt of a
price discrimination. The Court rejected the Commission's contention
that enforcement of section 2 (f) must be simplified, stating that the
20 Supra note 17, at 80. (Emphasis added.) Some commentators have tended to ob-
scure the extent of the Commission's burden by emphasizing the fact that the Court
only purported to be dealing with the burden of going forward with the evidence,
rather than the ultimate burden of proof. See Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
Robinson-Patman Act 441-43 (1962). However, in dealing with this initial burden the
court clearly stated that the Commission must assume the absolute burden of proof on
the question of cost justification as a part of its prima fade case, if there were dif-
ferences in the methods by which competitors were served.
21 Supra note 17, at 71.
22 Supra note 17, at 71-72.
23 Supra note 17, at 81.
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Commission's interpretation "might readily extend beyond the prohi-
bitions of the Act" and "help give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity
in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation."24 On
the other hand, the Court emphasized that the competitive goals of the
antitrust laws could only be effected by "sturdy bargaining between
buyer and seller"25 and that the buyer cannot be placed at his peril
"whenever he engages in price bargaining."26
B. Group Buying Cases Under Section 2(f)
Following the decision in the Automatic Canteen case, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission reoriented its program for enforcement of sec-
tion 2 (f) in order to concentrate on preventing groups of individual
purchasers from banding together for the purpose of obtaining special
prices not available to their competitors.
It is fair to say that section 2 (f) has come to be used primarily to
attack group buying programs. Economically, these proceedings are
significant inasmuch as the Commission has pressed its attack even
when the members of such groups are small businessmen who are
poorly situated to evaluate the complexities of the seller prohibitions
in the Robinson-Patman Act. The emphasis which the Commission has
placed on cases against small cooperative buyers is surprising in the
light of Automatic Canteen's rejection of any rule of caveat emptor
and the legislative history indicating that the Act was passed to curb
the predatory activities of large buyers 7
Between 1936 and 1965, one-half of the thirty 2(f) cases adjudi-
cated before the Commission were brought against buying groups. 8
Thirteen of the twenty-one 2 (f) cease and desist orders which the Com-
24 Supra note 17, at 63.
25 Supra note 17, at 74.
26 Supra note 17, at 73.
27 See, e.g., 80 Cong. Rec. 8111 (1936); 79 Cong. Rec. 9078 (1935). As the Com-
mission stated in its opinion in Shulton, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16992 (1964):
The Robinson-Patman Act was passed "to curb and prohibit all devices by
which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by
virtue of their greater purchasing power."
28 National Parts Warehouse, Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16700 (1963); Automotive job-
bers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 19, 33 (1962); Automotive Southwest, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 590, 596
(1960); Southwestern Warehouse Distribs., Inc., 57 F.T.C. 611, 621 (1960); March of
Toys, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 486, 496 (1960); Albright's, 55 F.T.C. 1556 (1959); American
Motor Specialties Co., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1430 (1959); D & N Auto Parts Co., 55 F.T.C.
1279 (1959) ; Borden-Aicklen Auto Supply Co., 55 F.T.C. 1279 (1959) ; Hunt-Marquardt,
Inc., 55 F.T.C. 910 (1958); Midwest Warehouse Distribs., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 414 (1953);
Warehouse Distribs., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 188 (1958); Atlas Supply Co., 48 F.T.C. 53 (1951);
Associated Merchandising Corp., 40 F.T.C. 578 (1945); Golf Ball Mfrs. Ass'n, 26 F.T.C.
824 (1938).
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mission ultimately obtained in this period of time were against buying
groups.29 The only three 2(f) proceedings in which the Commission
has prevailed before reviewing courts were directed at buying groups3
In particular, the Commission has concentrated its group buying
attack on the efforts of small jobbers engaged in the purchase and sale
of automotive replacement parts. In twelve cases, the Commission at-
tacked the operations of jobber cooperatives allegedly set up for the
purpose of obtaining a volume rebate which the members could not
have received on the basis of their individual purchases.31 The coopera-
tive members argued that they had to band together to meet the com-
petition of larger integrated purchasers. Although section 4 of the
Robinson-Patman Act permits cooperatives to distribute earnings to
members, both the Second and the Fifth Circuits have affirmed Com-
mission 2 (f) decisions against cooperative programs to rebate members
in proportion to their individual purchases. 2 Two proceedings are still
pending before the Commission.3 3 Six of these proceedings resulted in
consent orders to cease and desist.34
29 All but one or two of the proceedings cited in supra note 28, terminated with
the entry of cease and desist orders. See National Parts Warehouse, supra note 28,
where a petition for certiorari is pending after the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Com-
mission order. General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965).
20 Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961); American Motor
Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960); General Auto Supplies, Inc.
v. FTC, supra note 29.
31 Alhambra Motor Parts, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1007, 1022 (1960) (Cease and Desist
Order). See also Ark-La-Tex Warehouse Distribs., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. J 28258 (1959)
(Complaint); Automotive Jobbers, Inc., supra note 28; Automotive Southwest, Inc.,
supra note 28; Southwestern Warehouse Distribs., Inc., supra note 28; March of Toys,
Inc., supra note 28; Albright's, supra note 28; American Motor Specialties Co., supra
note 28; D & N Auto Parts Co., supra note 28; Borden-Aicklen Auto Supply Co., Inc.,
supra note 28; Hunt-Marquardt, Inc., supra note 28; Midwest Warehouse Distribs., Inc.,
supra note 28; Warehouse Distribs., Inc., supra note 28.
32 Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961); American Motor
Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960). Both courts held that the co-
operative exemption of § 4 [49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13b (1964)] did not
insulate the return of profits on price benefits which the members could not achieve
if they purchased individually. In retrospect, this conclusion seems oddly at variance
with the intent of the drafters of the Act to encourage the cooperative movement, HR.
Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), and to guarantee them "the achievement
of full economies and price advantages." 80 Cong. Rec. 9415 (1936).
33 Alhambra Motor Parts, Inc., supra note 31; See Ark-La-Tex Warehouse Distribs.,
Inc., supra note 31.
34 Automotive Southwest, Inc., supra note 28; Southwestern Warehouse Distribs.,
Inc., supra note 28; Albright's, supra note 28; Hunt-Marquardt, Inc., supra note 28;
Midwest Warehouse Distribs., Inc., supra note 28; Warehouse Distribs., Inc., supra
note 28.
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In these cases important questions have arisen as to what indicates
that a member of a group is a "customer" of the manufacturer, and as
to what burden of proof the Commission bears on the issues of cost
justification and knowledge. Detailed review of the resolution of these
issues discloses some of the difficulty which the buyer faces in resolving
complex antitrust questions in his day-to-day operations.
1. Identity of the Seller's "Customer" in Group Buying Cases Under
Section 2 (f)
The Robinson-Patman Act only prohibits price discriminations
between customers of the same supplier.2 Moreover, the Act does not
prohibit price differentials to customers who are at different functional
levels. For instance, a wholesaler may lawfully receive a more favor-
able price than a retailer. 6 The Commission has reasoned that such
functional discounts cannot injure competition when wholesalers and
retailers do not compete for the same customers. Hence, if members of
a group purchase merchandise from a wholesaler at a special price
which is not available to non-members buying directly from manufac-
turers, it seems that no violation of the Robinson-Patman Act occurs.
The manufacturer can accord a special price to the wholesaler, which
is not available to the retailer because there is no injury to competition.
However, the Federal Trade Commission has been quick to attack
plans wherein members of an association set up a wholly-owned and
controlled dummy company at a higher functional level for the purpose
of receiving functional prices to which the members would not ordi-
narily be entitled."7
At the core of every one of the Commission's proceedings against
35 National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds,
352 U.S. 419 (1957); Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y.
1957).
6 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 475 (1952); General Foods Co., 52 F.T.C.
798 (1956); Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943).
37 This attack has not been limited to cases involving group ownership of a dummy
corporation. A single purchaser is equally in violation of § 2(f) if he sets up a wholly-
owned and controlled wholesaler for the purpose of obtaining wholesale discounts on
merchandise which he resells as a retailer. See, e.g., Automotive Supply Co., 56 F.T.C.
192 (1959). Likewise a supplier violates § 2(a) by selling at a wholesale discount to
a wholesaler controlled by a retailer, when the controlling retailer ultimately sells the
merchandise at retail, in competition with retailers buying at a higher price. Monroe
Auto Equip. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. 11 70011 (1964), aff'd, Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v.
FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965). An integrated purchaser is only entitled to a
wholesale discount on that percentage of the merchandise which he resells to unaffiliated
retailers. See Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943); Van Cise, "How to Quote
Functional Prices," Proceedings, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Section on Antitrust Law, Anti-
trust Symposium 80, 94 (1957).
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automotive cooperatives was the fact that the cooperative was wholly
owned and controlled by jobber customers.3" It thus was felt not to be
an independent customer or reseller.39
The early cases instituted against these automotive cooperative
buying groups attacked members' receipt of retroactive cumulative
volume rebates.40 Later proceedings also challenged the members'
receipt of the functional compensation usually accorded automotive
replacement parts purchasers operating at the higher functional level
of "warehouse distributor. '4 1 The Commission has held that these co-
operatives are not classifiable as "warehouse distributors. 4 2
In the recent National Parts Warehouse case, 43 the Commission
found that automotive jobbers could not hold a limited partnership
interest in a warehouse distributor when they realized price advantages
not available to their independent competitors. NPW argued that
limited partnership structure prevented the jobber from maintaining
operating control of the warehouse. According to NPW, the warehouse
was an independent entity under the operating control of a general
partner. However, the Commission held that the jobber partners con-
trolled the prices they received, and that in fact they had exercised a
good deal of operational control.44
38 See cases cited supra note 28.
30 The evidence in these cases showed that jobber members of the cooperative
owned all stock in the company, elected its officers and managers, voted on lines to be
handled, negotiated directly with suppliers for prices, voted on election of new members
that might take advantage of the prices obtained through the cooperative, and for-
warded orders to suppliers. Members were fully aware of the day-to-day operation of
the cooperative and its financial position. See, e.g., Alhambra Motor Parts, Inc., Trade
Reg. Rep. ff 17138 (1964) (Supplemental Initial Decision); American Motor Specialties
Co., 55 F.T.C. 1430, 1432-34 (1959).
40 See, e.g., Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961); American
Motor Specialties Co., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960). These cumulative
volume rebates were offered to all customers regardless of the level at which they
resold.
41 There are three traditional levels of independent distribution among purchasers
in the automotive replacement parts market. In descending order, they are as follows:
(1) Warehouse Distributors who sell only to jobbers; (2) Jobbers who sell only to
dealers; (3) Dealers who sell only to consumers. The Commission has attacked jobber
cooperatives when they sought to receive warehouse distributor discounts. See complaints
in Automotive Jobbers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 19 (1962); Alhambra Motor Parts, Inc., supra
note 31; Ark-La-Tex Warehouse Distribs., Inc., supra note 31.
42 See cases cited supra note 41.
43 Note 28 supra.
44 The Commission Opinion in National Parts Warehouse, supra note 28, sug-
gested in dicta that a violation of § 2(f) can be demonstrated without a showing of
jobber "management control." National Parts Warehouse, supra note 28, at 6-7. Never-
theless, in every automotive case where the Commission has denied a jobber-owned
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On May 28, 1965, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Commission
decision in the National Parts Warehouse case.45
In rejecting the arguments that the limited partnership form pre-
cluded jobber control of NPW and that NPW was controlled solely by
its general partner and manager, the court stated that it was "con-
vinced that the absoluteness of . . . [the manager's] control is formal
but unreal and was meant to be that way."4
The original cases brought against buying groups had involved
mere buying offices which forwarded members' orders. However, the
Commission has recently proceeded against groups which maintain
substantial warehouse and delivery facilities and which perform many
functions common to independent warehouse distributors. In the NPW
case, the Commission flatly held that NPW could not be classified as
a warehouse distributor even though it performed an actual warehous-
ing function. The critical fact cited by the Commission was that jobber
partners of NPW "own it outright" and "control" the flow of its in-
come to their pockets 7
On the other hand, in a proceeding against the Southern Califor-
nia Jobbers cooperative, the Ninth Circuit refused to accept this view
when it was shown that a cooperative performed substantial warehous-
ing functions.48 It remanded so that the Commission could take further
evidence on the question of whether a cooperative warehouse should
be regarded as a purchaser or an agent. On remand, however, the Com-
entity the status of warehouse distributor, there has been evidence that the jobbers in
fact controlled the actual day-to-day operation of the company attempting to claim the
warehouse distributor status. See National Parts Warehouse, supra note 28, at 9-10. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals placed an even greater emphasis upon the fact of
jobber ownership and control in affirming the Commission order in the NPW case. It
did not endorse the dicta that a violation of § 2(f) might be established absent jobber
management control. After quoting verbatim from the Commission's findings on control,
it held that the jobbers had controlled NPW, noting that the absoluteness of the so-
called general partner's control was "unreal and was meant to be that way." General
Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, infra note 45, at 315.
45 General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1965).
48 Id. at 315.
47 Supra note 28, at 13.
48 Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962). Of course, the
question of performance of warehouse functions would not be relevant if the entity
claiming a warehouse distributor status was not owned by jobbers. The fact that a
manufacturer makes direct shipments to customers of an independent warehouse dis-
tributor does not deprive that warehouse distributor of its functional status. See Mueller
Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963); Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962);
Whitaker Cable Corp., 51 F.T.C. 958, 973 (1955). The respondents in the Alhambra case
elected not to appeal any issue pertaining to direct shipments. Hence, the court had no
occasion to rule on this question in a context of jobber ownership.
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mission again concluded that the SCJ cooperative was not entitled to
the functional status of an independent purchaser. 49 However, Com-
missioner Elman filed an extensive dissenting opinion expressing the
view that a "wholesale organization owned cooperatively by a group of
retailers is no less a bona fide wholesaler because of its cooperative
ownership."5 0 Basing his opinion on the nature of the competition of
small jobber groups in the automotive replacement parts market,
Commissioner Elman noted:
.. . the economies of distribution and marketing achieved by co-
operatives such as SCJ may substantially invigorate competition at
the jobber level.51
Accordingly, he suggests that section 4 of the Act should be reevaluated
to provide immunity for cooperatives which C... perform genuine
marketing functions that not only are valuable to their members but
serve the public interest in promoting efficiency and economies of
distribution, thereby enlarging rather than restricting competition.""
A second dissenting opinion filed by Commissioner Mary Gardiner
Jones found that in fact SCJ competed at the jobber level by virtue
of jobber ownership, but at the same time noted a belief that the
framers of the Robinson-Patman Act did not intend to discourage or
prevent "companies which function on one level of distribution from
assuming the functions of companies on another level of distribution
and from being compensated for the performance of those functions to
the same extent as those companies on the other functional level whose
services they have copied and assumed." 3
Hence, in the SCJ case, the Commission has followed its usual
ruling that a jobber-owned entity is not entitled to the status of ware-
house distributor-purchaser. However, the persuasiveness of the Com-
mission's opinion is in some measure diminished by the searching
dissenting opinions of Commissioners Elman and Jones, both of which
49 The hearing examiner also concluded that even though SC "is substantially per-
forming the functions of a warehouse distributor," Trade Reg. Rep. f[ 17138 (Dec. 14,
1964) (Supplemental Initial Decision), it "is merely the creature of its members,
is wholly controlled by them, and has no purpose other than to serve them." Ibid. The
Seventh Circuit added confusion to the situation by holding in a 2(c) brokerage pro-
ceeding against Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, that a cooperative could be a pur-
chaser even though (1) it was wholly owned and controlled by its members, (2) it was
set up to obtain favorable prices for its members, and (3) all of the merchandise pur-
chased by its members was shipped direct from suppliers to these members. Central
Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
50 Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Elman at 2.
51 Id. at 19.
52 Id. at 20.
53 Dissenting Opinion of Mary Gardiner Jones at 5.
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stress the competitive values of cooperative organizations in the auto-
motive parts market. The effect of these dissents, in the event the SCI
respondents appeal to the Ninth Circuit, remains to be seen. Never-
theless, it is fully feasible that the court will undertake an economic
reappraisal of the benefits of cooperative competition under section 4
of the Act.
In the meantime, the beleaguered buyer, who is commanded to
avoid the receipt of illegal functional compensation when he has knowl-
edge of illegality, is faced with a situation wherein the Commission
rulings are subject to doubt in the light of conflicts created by the SCI
Ninth Circuit opinion. Apparently, until some final resolution of this
problem takes place, the purchaser in the automotive parts market acts
at his peril.
2. The Burden of Proof on Cost Justification and Knowledge in Group
Buying Cases Under 2 (f)
Group buying operations can survive under the Act by virtue of
section 2 (a) which expressly provides that a price differential is per-
missible if it does not exceed the seller's cost savings in doing business
with the favored customers.54 Although the Commission has minimized
this defense in section 2(a) seller cases by establishing stringent
criteria for establishing cost justification by proof of the seller's actual
costs,55 it appears that this defense has substantial validity in a 2(f)
case.
Seemingly, the Commission is required under Automatic Canteen
to disprove the possibility of cost justification in a 2 (f) case by refer-
ence to the same type of evidence which the seller must present in a
2 (a) case, i.e., by reference to detailed proof of the seller's actual costs.
Under these standards, it would appear that few, if any, 2 (f) convic-
tions would be obtained inasmuch as group operations may result in
some economies in warehousing, collection, credit, and billing.
The problems involved in carrying the burden of proof on cost
justification are illustrated by the recent Commission proceeding
against the Soutkern California Jobbers cooperative. That group
owned a warehouse, ordered in large quantities, accepted financial re-
sponsibility for payment, shipped to its members from the warehouse,
and billed them. Direct buying competitors were shipped direct. Al-
though Commission counsel had introduced no evidence to negate cost
54 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
55 In the two 2 (a) cases where sellers have attempted to cost justify prices to group
members, the defense of cost justification has been rejected on grounds of lack of specific
evidence of the seller's costs. C. E. Niehoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114, 1148-49 (1955); See
Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 42-43 (1953).
56 Alhambra Motor Parts, Inc., supra note 31.
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justification, the Commission held that this operation was illegal and
that the members received discounts in violation of 2 (a).57 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded this case to the Commission
with instructions that the Commission produce evidence to demonstrate
that prices received by the members were not cost justified by the group
operation. After noting that there were differences in the methods by
which direct buying jobbers and member jobbers were served, the
court held: "The burden [is] on the Commission to show that the cost
savings could not be commensurate with the price differential.""
The significant question now is what type of proof can the Com-
mission introduce to demonstrate that a price differential cannot be cost
justified. One would expect that the Commission should be required to
present the same detailed evidence of the manufacturers' actual costs
which it has required of manufacturers in 2 (a) casesG9
The hearing examiner held Commission counsel to this stringent
burden in the proceedings on remand in the SCI case. 0 Commission
counsel did not present a cost study of the manufacturer's actual costs,
but instead tried to prove that SCJ did not perform the same services
as independent warehouse distributors. Treating this as a concession
that prices to independent warehouses were cost justified, the examiner
found that SCJ had performed substantially the same function and
that complaint counsel has failed to negate cost justification.
Where complaint counsel met the real issue, viz., the actual cost
of serving SCJ and independent jobbers, the examiner applied a strin-
gent burden of proof. For instance, Commission counsel argued that
the SCJ warehouse did not save manufacturers any money because
manufacturers maintain their own warehouses. The examiner recog-
nized that this fact might reduce the savings to manufacturers, but
that the burden of proving this was on Commission counsel. The ex-
aminer, therefore, rejected the argument stating:
.. complaint counsel have failed to establish that the amount
of such reduction is substantial and that it affects the bulk of the
lines carried by SCJ.61
Again, the impact of the Automatic Canteen holding is evident.
57 Ibid.
58 Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213, 219 (9th Cir. 1962). In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court rejected the Commission contention that each member
must show that he personally (as opposed to the cooperative warehouse) rendered
services which reduced the manufacturers' costs. Id. at 217.
G9 See, e.g., C. E. Niehoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114, 1148-49 (1955); Champion Spark
Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 42-43 (1954).
GO Trade Reg. Rep. ff 17138 (Dec. 14, 1964) (Supplemental Initial Decision).
61 Id. at 32.
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On appeal from the Examiner's ruling, the Commission held by a
3-2 vote that complaint counsel had carried the burden of disproving
cost justification.62 However, the dissenting opinions of Commissioners
Jones and Elman both suggest that the Commission has ignored that
previous ruling and has gone too far in putting the burden of proof
of cost justification on buying group respondents. According to Com-
missioner Elman, the majority decision on cost justification is "based
on speculation . . . ."6 Commissioner Jones finds that warehousing,
credit, collection, and other functions performed by SCJ and other
warehouse distributors reduce the manufacturer's expenses in selling
to the jobber-customer.6 Noting that the warehouse distributor dis-
counts received by SCJ are "reasonably related" to the services per-
formed by independent warehouse distributors and SCJ, she holds that
SCJ is entitled to receive such discounts.6 ' If appealed, there is no
question that the case will raise substantial questions as to the Com-
mission's compliance with the previously enunciated standards of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. For instance, the Commission major-
ity held that SCJ did not relieve suppliers of warehousing expenses by
maintaining its own warehouse, because some SCJ suppliers maintained
their own local warehouses in the area where SCJ was located. 6 How-
ever, the Commission did not consider such facts as the manufacturer's
possible additional costs in central or home office warehousing in selling
direct buying jobbers, if it had not utilized the facilities of SCJ's ware-
house. Similarly, such expenses as centralized billing and credit expense
were dismissed out of hand as "relatively insignificant,"67 although
Commissioner Jones comments that "the manufacturers and warehouse
distributors who testified rated their centralized billing and credit
function high among the cost saving functions performed.68
Similarly, in the National Parts Warehouse case, the Commission
appears to have ignored the ruling of the Ninth Circuit in the SC!
case. It ruled flatly that the discounts to favored jobbers could not
be justified even though there was no study of manufacturers' actual
costs introduced in evidence 69 Indeed, the Commission's opinion is
based, in part, on the evidence of NPW's costs, rather than the seller's
62 Dkt. No. 6889 (December 17, 1965) (Opinion).
63 Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Elnan at 10.
64 Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Jones at 10-11.
85 Id. at 11.
66 Opinion at 12.
67 Ibid.
88 Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Jones at 9.
69 National Parts Warehouse, Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16700 (Dec. 16, 1963).
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costs. Of course, no seller has ever been allowed to prove his costs by
reference to buyer's costs in a 2 (a) proceeding."0
The Seventh Circuit affirmance of the Commission decision in the
National Parts Warehouse case gives little consideration to the cost
justification issue. The court quoted the tests set forth in the Automatic
Canteen case to the effect that the Commission did not have the burden
of proof on cost justification where the buyer "is served by the seller
in the same manner or with the same amount of exertion as the other
buyer."' Thus, it was apparently assumed that the methods of serving
NPW jobbers and independent jobbers were not sufficiently different
to shift the burden of proof on cost justification to the Commission.
Hence, in interpreting the burden of proof requirements set forth
in Automatic Canteen, the Commission has applied rules which diverge
substantially from those followed in seller cases. The result is that the
prosecution is placed in a more favorable position than the seller re-
spondent. In doing so, the spirit of the Automatic Canteen and SCI
cases seems to be violated. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted the Com-
mission's strict requirements of proof of actual costs in seller cases in
the Automatic Canteen decision 2 and allocated the burden of present-
ing such evidence to the Commission in buyer cases because it is "on
a better footing to obtain this information than the buyer.M3
The Commission's treatment of the all-important issue of knowl-
edge of illegality in automotive group cases is equally confused. While
not adopting any rule of caveat emptor, the Commission has certainly
placed great reliance on the fact that the buyer knew he was receiving
a lower price than his competitor.
The National Parts Warehouse decision74 seems to attribute so-
phisticated knowledge of controversial cost justification issues to small
70 In Purolator Prods., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. fI 16877 (April 3, 1964), the Com-
mission held that a purchaser's costs were irrelevant in a 2(a) proceeding. See also
Ark-La-Tex Warehouse Distribs., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 17205 (Feb. 18, 1965) (Second
Initial Decision); Monroe Auto Equip. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. f 70011 (July 18, 1964)
(concurring opinion).
71 National Parts Warehouse v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 1965).
72 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953). The Court commented
that
whenever costs have been in issue, the Commission has not been content with
accounting estimates; a study seems to be required, involving perhaps stop-watch
studies of time spent by some personnel such as salesmen and truck drivers,
numerical counts of invoices or bills and in some instances of the number of
items or entries on such records, or other such quantitative measurement of the
operation of a business.
73 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953).
74 National Parts Warehouse, Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16700 (Dec. 16, 1963).
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businessmen. Although there was no showing in that case that NPW
partners had any detailed knowledge of manufacturers' actual costs,
the Commission held that knowledge the NPW's cost of operation was
only 8 percent of the 20 percent discounts received, that manufacturers
paid commissions to their salesmen calling on NPW partners, and that
manufacturers rendered so-called extra services to NPW partners, was
sufficient to establish the requisite knowledge. Similarly, in the SCI
case, the Commission found knowledge of illegality based on a sweep-
ing statement that "from their trade experience generally, SCJ's mem-
ber jobbers must have been aware of the fact that their suppliers were
spending approximately the same effort" selling to them and to direct
buying jobbers. 5 However, the validity of this finding is certainly
subjected to question by the searching dissents of Commissioners
Elman and Jones, both of which hold that SCJ jobbers were entitled
to believe in the legality of discounts received when they knew that the
SCJ warehouse performed functions not generally performed by com-
peting jobbers.7" In a similar vein to these dissents, the court in the
ninth circuit prescribed a Rule of Reason test for determining the
buyers' actual knowledge when it has been shown that the group pur-
chasing program may achieve real economies for the supplier77 in its
earlier SCI opinion.
While the ultimate trend of court rulings on this complex question
is not yet clear,78 it is evident that a caveat emptor ruling that small
buyers are to be charged with knowledge of complex cost justifying
factors can only curtail that "sturdy bargaining" which Automatic Can-
teen sought to protect. It will compel small group buying jobbers to
passively accept the highest prices offered by their suppliers to inde-
pendent jobbers, regardless of the price stabilizing anti-competitive
effects of such a practice.
C. Proceedings Against Single Buyers Under Section 2(f)
Probably the most significant characteristic of the recent FTC
program for enforcement of section 2 (f) has been its failure to proceed
against single buyers with dominant economic power. Since the Auto-
matic Canteen decision, the Commission's enforcement of 2(f) has
been almost wholly directed toward the groups of small jobbers in the
automotive replacement parts industry. Following Automatic Canteen,
75 Opinion at 15.
76 See Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Elnan at 10 and Dissenting Opinion
of Commissioner Jones at 11.
-7 Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
78 A petition for certiorari filed by the respondents in the NPW case has now
been withdrawn.
[Vol. 27
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
the Commission dismissed all pending proceedings against large single
buyers." Only six new 2(f) cases have been instituted against single
buyers. One of these resulted in a consent cease and desist order,8 0 two
proceedings were terminated by dismissals,"' and three cases are now
pending. s2
In the automotive replacement parts market, the Commission's
failure to take the initiative in prosecuting cases against powerful single
jobbers, when combined with its diligent prosecution of group buying
jobbers, may have fostered drastic competitive inequities.8 3 The fact is
that the Commission has all but ignored the development of large com-
petitive jobbers in the automotive replacement parts market who have
taken advantage of the benefits of integration by opening their own
dummy warehouse distributor companies for the purpose of obtaining
warehouse distributor compensation which is not available to competi-
tive jobbers. Similarly, warehouse distributors have opened their own
affiliated jobbing branches which sell merchandise purchased at ware-
house distributor prices in direct competition with jobbers who are un-
able to obtain such warehouse distributor prices.
The Commission's failure to institute 2(f) proceedings against
such integrated jobbers is all the more surprising in view of the fact
that the critical economic effect of the practices of such companies was
brought to its attention as early as 1958. In that year it originated its
only 2(f) proceeding against such a buyer, that being the complaint
against Automotive Supply Co. of Altoona, Pennsylvania. 4
In large part, that proceeding was directed at the use of a dummy
warehouse distributor which received warehouse distributor discounts
79 See Crown Zellerbach Corp., 51 F.T.C. 733 (1955); Kroger Co., 50 F.T.C. 213
(1953); Safeway Stores, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 125 (1953). See also Sylvania Elec. Prods.,
Inc., Dkt. No. 5728 (Dec. 9, 1953) (Initial Decision), not appealed by the staff.
80 Automotive Supply Co., 56 F.T.C. 192 (1958).
81 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 210 F. Supp. 67 (D.D.C. 1962); American Metal Prods.,
60 F.T.C. 1667 (1962).
82 Suburban Propane Gas Corp., Dkt. No. 8672 (Nov. 26, 1965) (Complaint);
Beatrice Foods Co. & Kroger Co., Dkt. No. 8663 (July 30, 1965) (Complaint); Fred
Meyer, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16500 (March 29, 1963). The Fred Meyer case, which is
pending in the ninth circuit, is particularly significant in that the Commission again found
2(f) liability without introducing any evidence of the supplier's actual costs in the adminis-
trative proceeding. Indeed, the Commission refused to analyze whether or not respondent's
volume of purchases (vis-h-vis those of the nonfavored buyers named by the examiner)
did in fact affect cost savings. Instead, the Commission found that the respondents had
every reason to believe that there was not the remotest possibility of cost justification.
Thus, the Commission confused the issue of knowledge with the issue of cost justification.
83 See Barnes, "The Robinson-Patman Challenge to Buyers Competition," 9 Anti-
trust Bull. 415, 450-52 (1964).
84 Automotive Supply Co., 56 F.T.C. 192 (1959).
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on merchandise which was in fact funneled to jobber branch outlets
and sold in competition with independent jobbers. Though the entry
of a cease and desist order appeared to foreshadow a Commission
drive against jobber-owned warehouses of the Altoona type, the Com-
mission never instituted another 2(f) proceeding against a similar
jobber-owned entity.
Nevertheless, the existence of such organizations in the automo-
tive replacement parts market is a matter of public record. Indeed, the
Commission's complaint in its recent proceeding against Monroe Auto
Equipment Co. charged that Monroe had violated section 2 (a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act by discriminating in the prices of automotive
products which it sold to jobbers who had formed their own dummy
warehouse distributor companies.85 Evidence indicated that Monroe
had accorded warehouse distributor discounts to three warehouse
distributor corporations that were affiliated with or controlled by
jobbers. 86 The Commission viewed the decisive question to be whether
there is sufficient identification of the warehouse distributor with the
jobber to give rise to the conclusion that a discount given to one will
inure to the benefit of the other. The Commission proceeded to examine
the factual circumstances of each of the three jobber warehouses in-
volved, concluding that "for all practical purposes these organizations
operate as a single unit so that any benefit conferred on one would...
result in a direct benefit to the other." On review, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the Commission's ruling.87
While proceedings against sellers such as Monroe are no doubt
useful, the Commission itself has recognized that the purposes of the
Act can best be carried out if proceedings are brought against the
offending buyers.8" Thus, one wonders why section 2 (f) proceedings
have not been instituted against the offending buyers involved in the
Monroe case and against similar jobber-controlled warehouse distribu-
tors.
The extent of the possible competitive inequalities fostered by
the Commission's enforcement policy is indicated from a review
of the total purchase figures of the alleged buying groups which the
commission is presently prosecuting, viz., SCJ, NPW, and Ark-La-Tex,
85 Monroe Auto Equip. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16170 (Nov. 5, 1962) (Complaint).
86 Monroe Auto Equip. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 17011 (July 28, 1964) (Opinion).
87 Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965). See also Purolator
Products, Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), holding that extra discounts to
jobber owned warehouses violated section 2(a).
88 Shulton, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16992 (July 22, 1964).
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as compared to the purchase figures of a single large integrated jobber.
In the year 1958, the total purchases of jobbers through these so-called
groups were:
SCJ $ 3,129,446.0089
Ark-La-Tex 1,057,324.6090
NPW 4,664,921.001
Hence, in the aggregate, the purchases of the jobbers involved in these
cases total less than 10,000,000 dollars in the year 1958. On the other
hand, Automotive Supply Co. of Altoona apparently made purchases
of approximately 10,000,000 dollars in that same year. 2 Arguably, the
Commission may have accomplished as much in terms of competitive
effect in its one proceeding against the Automotive Supply Co. as it has
in the long and costly litigated proceedings against NPW, SCJ, and
Ark-La-Tex.
Some have suggested that 2 (f) proceedings may not provide a
full answer to the economic problems of the industry.93 Perhaps
industry-wide trade practice rules are the only possible solution to
the economic ills of the automotive replacement parts market. Although
the Commission has adopted an industry-wide approach to the competi-
tive problems of some industries,94 it has not done so in the automotive
replacement parts market0 5 Having apparently committed itself to
a narrow course of enforcement through case-by-case litigation, it
appears that the failure to enforce section 2(f) against integrated
jobbers may, indeed, further jeopardize the status of healthful compe-
tition in the much beleaguered automotive replacement parts market.
89 Trade Reg. Rep. f1 17138 (Dec. 14, 1964).
90 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 15524 (Oct. 13, 1961) (Initial Decision).
91 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16700 (Dec. 16, 1963).
92 Automotive Supply Co., 56 F.T.C. 192, 194 (1958) (Complaint).
93 See the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman in National Parts Warehouse,
supra note 91, at 21624.
94 As it perhaps in all fairness must be, "industry-wide enforcement of the law is
almost a constitutional imperative as a matter of both fairness and equality before the
law. It is clear that we have no right to and could not permit some law violator to go
free while prosecuting others." Address by Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones, Bar
Association of the District of Columbia, Feb. 25, 1965. See also Universal-Rundle Corp.
v. FTC, 352 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1965), directing that a 2(a) proceeding be remanded for
action against respondent's competitors when respondent showed specific information
tending to show similar violations by these competitors.
95 As early as 1958, the Commission rejected requests for trade practice conferences
in the automotive replacement parts market.
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II. BUYER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 2 (c)
While the wording of the brokerage provision in section 2 (c) 9 is
complex and has not been definitively construed, the section's applica-
tion is relatively simple. It is directed at the following five types of
transactions: (1) the receipt from a buyer of brokerage by a broker
who represents the seller, or, conversely, the broker's receipt of broker-
age from a seller when he represents the buyer; (2) a broker's receipt
of brokerage from the seller when he is controlled by the buyer; (3) a
buyer's receipt of brokerage from the seller on purchases which he
makes for his own account; (4) a buyer's receipt of discounts in lieu of
brokerage on merchandise which he purchases for his own account;
(5) a broker's agreement to split with a buyer the commission received
from the seller, where the agreement results in a price discrimination
to the buyer.
The statute does not apply to brokerage payments in the above
situations in the case of "services rendered in connection with the sale
or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise." However, early Federal
Trade Commission decisions have construed this clause narrowly. The
courts have sustained Commission rulings that a buyer's broker cannot
receive commissions from the seller, even though he renders services
to the seller,97 that a buyer cannot receive brokerage through a broker
that he controls even though he renders services for the seller,"8
that payments to a broker on purchases for his own account are not
allowable even though the purchaser renders services to the seller,99
and that a purchaser cannot receive discounts in lieu of brokerage
96 Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 52 Stat. 446 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c)
(1964), provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of
value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or
discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the
sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to
such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein
where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the
direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person
by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
This section applies to sellers and buyers as well as sellers' brokers and buyers' brokers.
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
97 Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634
(1938).
98 Modern Marketing Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
99 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 US.
774 (1945).
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when he performs services of a kind which he normally performs for
himself.100
Because section 2 (c) sets forth a rule of per se illegality, defenses
such as lack of injury to competition, meeting competition, and cost
justification which ordinarily apply in section 2 (a) and 2 (f) cases have
been held inapplicable.'' Moreover, early Commission decisions gave
little consideration to whether discriminatory treatment is a prerequi-
site to a section 2 (c) violation, or whether the buyer's lack of knowl-
edge of the illegality would constitute a defense in a section 2 (c) case.
The Commission originally tended to treat prosecutions under section
2 (c) as subject to entirely different standards of legality than transac-
tions under sections 2 (a) and 2 (f).
Inasmuch as section 2 (c) applies equally to sellers, buyers, and
brokers, it may. drastically affect a buyer's business practices. Clearly
covered by section 2(c) are the buyer's receipt from a seller of
brokerage or discounts in lieu of brokerage, as well as his receipt from
the broker of part of the broker's commission.0 2 It is also clear that
section 2 (c) provides the Commission with an additional weapon for
attacking group purchasing programs as a part of which a controlled
intermediary receives brokerage from sellers in transactions wherein
group members are purchasing."0 3
There is no question that the Commission's enforcement of sec-
tion 2 (c) against buyers, sellers, and brokers has been vigorous. Pro-
ceedings have, in large part, been concentrated in the fresh fruit and
vegetable and grocery industries.0 4 As a result of vigorous investigation
and prosecution, the Commission has, since 1960, succeeded in obtain-
ing scores of cease and desist orders against persons in the citrus fruit
industry.105
100 FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 282 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1960).
101 Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939); Oliver Bros.,
Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1939).
102 See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
103 Modern Marketing Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
104 The Commission has tended to ignore the buyer's possible receipt of illegal
brokerage on his own purchases in other industries. For instance, one of the most com-
plained of practices in the automotive replacement parts market is the receipt of illegal
brokerage by warehouse distributors. Nevertheless the Commission has only attacked this
practice in a limited number of instances. See O.EM. Prods. Co., 60 F.T.C. 914 (1962);
Lannin Sales Co., 59 F.T.C. 1446 (1961); Atlas Supply Co., 48 F.T.C. 53 (1951).
105 Orders were issued against sellers for granting "brokerage" to customers buying
for their own account. See, e.g., Valley Fruit & Vegetable Co., 61 F.T.C. 1389 (1962);
Warren Fruit Co., 61 F.T.C. 980 (1962); Pure Gold, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 976 (1962); Spada
Fruit Sales Agency, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 908 (1962); Larry Lightner, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 575
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Unfortunately, the Commission's decisions do not clearly define
the prerequisites to buyers' liability under section 2(c). Indeed, its
past decisions have clouded such vital questions as the meaning of the
statutory terms "in lieu of brokerage," and "purchase or sale," as well
as the legal status of group purchasing intermediaries. As a practical
matter, the buyer may be unable to make a reasonable guess as to the
practical application of section 2 (c) to his day-to-day operations.
In part, some of these problems are clarified in the Federal Trade
Commission's Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable
Industry which were promulgated on April 15, 1965.106 However, in
other cases these rules amount to nothing more than a cursory re-
statement of the statute or the Commission's earliest interpretations
of 2 (c). In many areas the rules fail to detail important current devel-
opments wherein both the courts and the Commission have followed
the Supreme Court's Automatic Canteen analysis in rejecting a caveat
emptor approach to buyer's liability under 2 (c). Hence, the current
scope of the brokerage clause as applied to buyers can best be evalu-
ated by reference to recent decisions concerning the types of transac-
tions which violate section 2(c) and the defenses which have been
particularly noted. A consideration of these matters follows.
A. Buyer's Liability for Receipt of Discounts in Lieu of Brokerage
Section 2 (c) forbids the buyer's receipt of price concessions which
actually represent a reduction in commissions normally paid brokers
by the supplier. The prohibition was incorporated into the Robinson-
Patman Act in response to the Commission's chain store investigation.
Congress' purpose was to prevent large buyers from taking an unfair
advantage of their greater purchasing power to coerce their suppliers
into granting discriminatory price concessions not granted to smaller
competitors.Y0 7
(1962); Charles A. Rogers & Sons, 61 F.T.C. 565 (1962); Alamo Fruit Distribs., Ltd.,
61 F.T.C. 515 (1962); Mission Fruit & Vegetable Co., 61 F.T.C. 419 (1962); Walter
Holding Co., 61 F.T.C. 413 (1962); Minute Maid Corp., 60 F.T.C. 475 (1962); Lake
Region Packing Ass'n, 60 F.T.C. 273 (1962); Lake Charm Fruit Co., 60 F.T.C. 270
(1962); Mission Citrus Growers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 244 (1962); Alamo Fruit & Vegetable
Co., 60 F.T.C. 208 (1962); Eustis Fruit Co., 60 F.T.C. 206 (1962); Pride O'Texas Citrus
Ass'n, 59 F.T.C. 1439 (1961); Kimbriel & Co., 59 F.T.C. 1428 (1961).
Corresponding orders were issued against buyer recipients. See, e.g., Dan A. LaPanta
Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16386 (April 22, 1963) ; Wayne L. Bowman Co., 61 F.T.C. 1294
(1962); Tom Lange Co., 61 F.T.C. 263 (1962); Brown and Loe, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1264
(1962); George C. Palmer Co., 60 F.T.C. 169 (1962). For similar buyer proceedings,
see also Dixie-Central Produce Co., 61 F.T.C. 67 (1962).
106 30 Fed. Reg. 5331 (1965). Rule 2 covers prohibited brokerage.
107 The Commission's Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Dkt. No.
4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63 (1935), stated the problem as follows:
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Section 2 (c)'s prohibition on discounts in lieu of brokerage is
aimed at factual situations containing the following elements:
(1) A large buyer knowingly negotiates for favored prices not ac-
corded his competitors;
(2) The seller normally sells to this buyer through brokers who re-
ceive a certain commission on each transaction;
(3) Pursuant to the buyer's proposal, the seller dispenses with
the services of the broker in this particular transaction and accords
the buyer a price reduction which accords with the broker's usual
commission;
(4) There are no reasons for the price reduction other than elimi-
nation of brokerage; the reduction serves no other purpose than
favoring a predatory buyer, and the buyer performs no new services
for the seller that he does not usually perform;
(5) Competing buyers are not accorded similar favored treat-
ment.
Although this outline of the necessary factual elements appears
simple enough, in some transactions it may be particularly difficult
to ascertain whether a particular price reduction or allowance is in
fact a "discount in lieu of brokerage." However, it is clear that a buyer
who receives a new discount or allowance after a seller has dispensed
with the services of a previously retained broker should not be the
target for attack if the discount he receives is routed in causal factors
Allowances for brokerage.-A number of the manufacturers in the grocery
group stated that they give allowances in lieu of brokerage to certain chain
customers. Some of these give this allowance only when the customer has a
buyer at the producing center or shipping point, the amount of such allowance
being equal to regular brokerage. Other manufacturers stated that they limit
the payment of such allowance to a few large chain customers and then only
in response to a demand. Such allowances are not uniform as between chains.
Where brokerage allowance is granted, some of the manufacturers allow co-
operative chains 2-Y2 per cent, while they allow corporate chains a brokerage
fee of 5 per cent. The reason for this discrimination is that it is necessary to
grant the larger discount to the corporate chains to obtain their business.
Some manufacturers who distribute through brokers stated that they
were required to pay brokerage not only to their brokers, but also to the chain
purchasers. One manufacturer, however, stated that where it pays brokerage to
one of the large chain-store purchasers, no brokerage is paid to its own broker.
The chain involved has established a buying agency which holds itself out to be
a merchandise broker. When the chain, through this buying agency, orders a car
of the products of the manufacturer for delivery to one destination, the buying
agency receives brokerage. If the manufacturer has a broker located in the
territory to which the products are shipped, the broker receives no brokerage.
However, when the buying agency of the chain orders a car of the products of
the manufacturer for delivery to more than one destination, a mixed shipment,
the brokerage is divided, the agency for the chain receiving one half and the
broker into whose territory the shipment is destined receiving the other half
of the brokerage fee.
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other than eliminated brokerage. Despite the Commission's frequent
references in its proceedings to a mathematical similarity between
eliminated brokerage and challenged discounts,108 the cases indicate
that a full economic analysis of the discount in question and the intent
of the parties is necessary to resolve the question of whether any dis-
count is "in lieu of brokerage." Indeed, such a rule of reason analysis
was unqualifiedly directed in the Supreme Court's first interpretation
of section 2 (c) in FTC v. Henry Brock & Co.109
In that case, the Court affirmed a Commission ruling that a broker
could not reduce his own commission to allow the supplier to pass along
a discriminatory discount to a particular large buyer." 0 However, the
Court rejected any mechanical test of mathematical similarity for pur-
poses of determining whether a particular allowance is in lieu of
brokerage. Following the same Rule of Reason economic analysis
espoused in Automatic Canteen, the Supreme Court said that a price
reduction to a buyer violates section 2 (c) as an allowance or discount
"in lieu of brokerage" only when it is equivalent in purpose and effect
to the payment of a broker's fee to the buyer. "[W]hether such a
reduction is tantamount to a discriminatory payment of brokerage
depends on the circumstances of each case.""'
This same point was made recently by the First Circuit in Robin-
son v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc."2 and by the Ninth Circuit in its
Whitney decision."' In Whitney the court said:
If it [a discount] serves the same purpose, has the same effect, and
enjoys no economic justification which entitles it to be distin-
guished, a so-called "interpacker" discount ought to be regarded as
an allowance in lieu of a commission or brokerage-but not other-
wisej 4
The Whitney, Robinson, and Broch cases indicate circumstances
in which an allowance may be in lieu of brokerage and thus in viola-
tion of section 2 (c). On the other hand, a lower price is not an allow-
108 See, e.g., Venus Foods, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1025 (1960); Kodiak Fisheries Co., 57
F.T.C. 107 (1960); Emard Packing Co., 55 F.T.C. 1235 (1959); Ward's Cove Packing
Co., 55 F.T.C. 49 (1958); Riviera Packing Co., 54 F.T.C. 731 (1957); Haskins Canning
Corp., 53 F.T.C. 1160 (1957); Bonner Packing Co., 47 F.T.C. 557 (1950); George A.
Bounds & Co., 33 F.T.C. 235 (1941); Union Sardine Co., 32 F.T.C. 1194 (1941);
Ramsdell Packing Co., 32 F.T.C. 1187 (1941).
109 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
11o The Commission action in Brock was brought against the broker rather than
against the supplier or buyer.
111 363 U.S. at 175-76.
112 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
11 In re Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959).
114 Id. at 215.
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ance in lieu of brokerage if it is causally conceived in considerations
other than a saved commission or brokerage fee. The actual purpose of
the allowances as shown by all of the evidence was stressed in each of
the three cases.
The Fifth Circuit also considered such circumstances in Thomas-
ville Chair Co. v. FTC."5 There the Commission had held that the
Thomasville Chair Company had violated section 2(c) by granting
a price reduction to certain of its customers while at the same time
giving its representatives only one-half of the ordinary commission
on sales to such customers. The Commission had found that the
reduced commission payment to the representatives was the basis for
the reduced price to the favored customers. The company contended
that the reduced price was justified on a basis other than the reduced
sales commission because the salesmen's efforts to secure sales to the
favored customers were not nearly so great as those involved in the
sales to those customers paying the higher price."" The court held
that a violation of section 2 (c) occurs only when a discount or allow-
ance is given which is not justified on some basis other than a saving
in brokerage or commission payments. Moreover, the court indicated
that even if the discount gave "effect to reduced commissions paid by
the seller,"" 7 the discrimination would not be a violation of 2(c) if
it could be cost justified under section 2 (a).""
Likewise, in Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC,"9 the
Seventh Circuit disapproved the Commission's "mathematical simi-
115 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962). One of the interesting factors in the Thomasville
Chair case was the implication in the Commission's decision that commissions to em-
ployees (salesmen), as well as to independent brokers were subject to section 2(c).
Thomasville argued strenuously that its representatives were in fact "employees" and
that it could reduce compensation to its employees in order to "cost justify" a discount
without running afoul of section 2(c). Commission counsel on the other band argued
that these representatives were "independent contractors" of the type that are normally
subject to section 2(c). The Commission decision is ambiguous as to whether Thomas-
vile's salesmen were held to be actual brokers or employees. However, the court of
appeals apparently concluded that these representatives were brokers of the same type
involved in the Broch case.
116 Thomasville's defense was predicated on an elaborate cost study showing savings
upon which it based its claim of a cost justification of these discounts. The Commis-
sion held that they had the burden of proving that factors other than brokerage ac-
counted for the whole price reduction. It ruled that Thomasville had not carried this
burden of proof.
117 Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, supra note 115, at 545.
118 The court remanded the case to the Commission for the taking of further
evidence to allow Thomasville to put in a full defense of cost justification. The Com-
mission subsequently dismissed the proceeding.
119 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
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larity" test for the determination of whether a discount in lieu of
brokerage exists. The Commission had held that receipt of allowances
by a purchaser-owned group constituted discounts "in lieu" of bro-
kerage where the allowances were mathematically similar to those
paid brokers. 2 ' After alluding to the valuable economic services per-
formed by the group, the court rejected the Commission's approach
noting the lack of "substantial evidence" to support the inference
drawn by the Commission to the effect that Central received or
accepted price concessions "in lieu of brokerage." Referring to the
mathematical similarity approach, the court expressed "doubt whether
this synthetic method of proving a violation of § 2 (c) is warranted."''
Similarly, in its Hruby Distrib. Co. decision, 22 the Commission
refused to follow the terms or labels which the parties attached to the
transaction or to base its decision on mathematical computation. The
complaint therein charged that Hruby, a purchaser of foodstuffs, had
received brokerage or allowances in lieu of brokerage on its own
purchases. 128 The hearing examiner found that Hruby had received
discounts in lieu of brokerage, noting that the net prices which Hruby
received "reflected a discount exactly equal to the standard brokerage
in question" and that the general manager of a supplier had testified
"that these net prices reflected a discount equal to and in lieu of the
standard brokerage payments .... 11124 On appeal, the Commission
reversed, holding that in fact Hruby had received functional discounts
for his services in selling to wholesalers. The opinion of Commissioner
Elman noted the economic fact that Hruby competed at a higher func-
tional level than wholesalers and he dismissed mathematical formulas
and verbal characterizations as a basis for decision. Commenting on
the parties' descriptions of the discounts as "brokerage," he noted
"the not surprising fact that businessmen, in describing their actions,
do not talk like lawyers expert in the niceties of the Robinson-Patman
Act."' 2
5
Thus, in the Hruby decision the Commission clearly brought itself
120 National Retail-Owned Grocers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1208, 1232 (1962). Indeed, the
Commission noted that it was unnecessary to show an exact correlation between the
two amounts.
121 Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 119, at 415.
122 61 F.T.C. 1429 (1962).
123 Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1429 (1962) (Complaint).
124 Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1429 (1962) (Initial Decision).
125 Id. at 1449. Commissioner Dixon joined in this opinion, but Commissioner
MacIntyre dissented vigorously stressing the tests of mathematical precision and verbal
characterization. Commissioners Higginbotham and Anderson did not participate in the
decision.
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into accord with judicial authority. However, in Flotill Products, Inc.'26
the Commission in finding a violation of section 2 (c) interjected con-
fusion by stressing mathematical computations along with a fleeting
reference to "brokerage" by one witness. One of the principal issues in
Flotill was a 232 percent promotional allowance granted by Flotill
to a wholesale grocer on its private brand merchandise. In holding that
this allowance was a discount in lieu of brokerage, the Commission
stressed "the mathematical identity of the allowance and the brokerage
paid on sales to many other customers,"' 27 and the fragmentary testi-
mony of one witness that he thought that "the fact we were buying
directly represented economies to them, a convenience to them, and
a sure outlet for their goods .... 1128 But the record in Flotill did not
indicate that a uniform rate of brokerage was paid to seller's brokers, 29
and the witness whose testimony the Commission quoted had unquali-
fiedly testified that all discussions between Flotill and the wholesaler
had related only to promotional allowances. Indeed, the Commission
itself recognized that the credit memoranda were designated "special
promotional allowances," that the funds were placed in the wholesaler's
promotional account, and that from time to time advertising tear sheets
were sent to Flotill and promotional programs were discussed with
them. 30 The Commission further agreed that the great number of
Flotill sales to the wholesaler both before and after the challenged
transaction had been made directly and without the services of a
broker. 3 '
It is difficult to reconcile Flotill with the Hruby decision decided
by the same three Commissioners, viz., Dixon, MacIntyre and Elman.
In Hruby, a two to one majority made up of Commissioners Elman
and Dixon ruled that sporadic references to brokerage in the testimony
were not sufficient to demonstrate a discount in lieu of brokerage.
However, in Flotill, Commissioners Dixon and MacIntyre joined in
holding such testimony indicative of illegality.1'3 2
126 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16970 (June 26, 1964).
127 Id. at 22039.
128 Id. at 22040.
129 The record in the Flotill case established that brokerage in the canned food
industry and indeed in transactions wherein FlotiU sold varied from 1 percent to 5
percent. Record, pp. 155, 270, 370, 434, 494, 1222.
130 Flotill Prods., Inc., supra note 126.
131 Id. at 22038.
132 Commissioner Elman dissented saying:
In the present case, the elimination of brokerage was not even simultaneous
with the granting of a concession, and both the elimination of brokerage and the
granting of a promotional allowance to Nash-Finch are explicable without any
reference to price discrimination-the first because it was economical for the
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Clarification may be derived from the Commission's new Trade
Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Industry. 3 Title 16,
section 74.2(e) states:
V. A discount or allowance by an industry member is in lieu of
brokerage if it is attributable to a reduction or elimination of bro-
kerage fees in connection with the sales transaction involved.
(1) A discount or allowance granted by an industry member to
some but not all customers would not under ordinary circumstances
be considered in lieu of brokerage if-
(i) The industry member granting same makes no sales
through brokers to any of his customers, or(ii) The industry member makes all of his sales through
brokers at the same brokerage rate.(2) The actual basis for a discount or allowance at the time it was
granted will indicate whether or not such was in lieu of brokerage.
The rule deals primarily with extreme and infrequent cases (e.g.,
where the seller makes no sales through brokers or makes all sales
through brokers). But it does recognize that the "actual basis for the
discount or allowance at the time it was granted will indicate whether
or not such was in lieu of brokerage." Seemingly, this provision recog-
nizes that all facts surrounding the discount, including its economic
justification and the intent of the parties, must be reviewed in accor-
dance with the rule of reason type of analysis directed in the Brock
case.
B. Broker's Receipt of Brokerage on His Own Purchases
As interpreted by the Federal Trade Commission, section 2 (c)
prohibits a broker from becoming a purchaser and receiving his
broker's fee in connection with a transaction wherein he purchases for
his own account. However, in the past five years, the Commission's
proceedings under section 2 (c) have clouded rather than clarified the
law with respect to the all-important question of whether a "purchase of
goods" has in fact taken place. As in 2 (f) proceedings, the Commission
decisions leave undefined vital questions pertaining to the meaning of
the term "purchase" in section 2 (c). The net result is that scores of
persons engaged in the distribution of produce and groceries are left
parties to do without a broker's services, the second because the seller received
a quid pro quo (i.e., promotional efforts on behalf of its products) for granting
the allowance.
Flotill Prods., Inc., supra note 126, at 22049. The diversity of opinion among Com-
missioners is heightened by Commissioner MacIntyre's dissent in the Hruby case.
Hruby Distrib. Co., supra note 122, at 1449.
133 Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Indus., supra note 106,
at 5333. (Emphasis added.)
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in a constant state of doubt as to whether in fact they fall in the classi-
fication of purchaser or broker in any particular transaction. Assuming
that all such persons are aware of the command that they may not
receive brokerage on their own purchases, they are forced to operate
in a legal vacuum as to whether in fact they are purchasing in particu-
lar transactions where they receive brokerage. Hence, the Commission's
rulings have created unique problems in regard to the application of
a caveat emptor doctrine under 2 (c).
To add to this confusion, the Federal Trade Commission's newly
promulgated Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Industry do not
define the term "purchase of goods" in section 2 (c).
Hence, the person operating in the chain of distribution is thrown
back on previously adjudicated cases for guidelines.
In the late 1930's, and during the 1940's, the Federal Trade
Commission attempted in a number of proceedings to indicate what
constitutes a "purchase" by a broker." 4 Typically, these cases involved
companies that speculated upon the possible future sales of food-
stuffs and who thus assumed the purchaser's risk of loss or gain.
The transactions involved merchandise shipped in less than carload
lots, and the brokers nominally acted as seller's representatives in
them. Where the broker was able to sell a substantial part of a pool
car, he would take title to the unsold portion in the pool car and resell
it. This was done as an alternative to waiting to direct shipment of
the pool car until orders for the entire carload had been received.
In other cases, these brokers would store merchandise, guarantee the
credit of buyers, buy insurance and pay taxes on goods, file claims
for damage to goods in their own names, and resell merchandise to
persons unknown to the original seller at prices negotiated by buyer
and broker-seller alone.' 35
During the past five years, the Federal Trade Commission has
considered similar arrangements in the food and vegetable industry.
For instance, in the Florida Citrus Exck. case,' the Commission held
that the seller had granted brokerage to a purchaser (called a con-
signee), noting that
The fruit was treated by these consignees as their own property,
sometimes stored in their own warehouses, insured at their own ex-
pense, included in their inventories for tax purposes, and sold to
persons whose names were unknown to respondent, under conditions
134 See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945);
Ketchikan Packing Co., 44 F.T.C. 158 (1947); Columbia River Packers Ass'n, Inc.,
44 F.T.C. 118 (1947); Fruit & Produce Exch., 30 F.T.C. 224 (1939).
135 See Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 140-47 (1959).
136 53 F.T.C. 493 (1956).
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of sale also unknown. These consignees made sales at varying prices
and treated resulting profits and losses as their own.137
In the Haines City Citrus Growers Ass'n case,1 38 the examiner
stressed the intent and understanding of the parties in his holding
that Haines had paid brokerage to two brokers who bought for their
own account. In holding that one of the brokers was a "purchaser,"
the examiner emphasized that he had:
• . . testified that he represented ten to fifteen packers on a strictly
brokerage basis, but that all his transactions with Respondent
Haines were strictly on an f.o.b.-market-price basis, and that he re-
sold the fruit . ..purchased from Respondent Haines to jobbers
and commission houses at prices determined by himself, which were
based on his costs plus freight plus mark-up.139
In the case of the other, the examiner emphasized that he had
transported the goods in his own trucks, insured them for his own
benefit, and defrayed all expenses involved in repacking and handling
the citrus fruit. 40
In holding that a purchaser cannot speculate on the rise and fall
of the market and receive brokerage in connection with such transac-
tions, the Haines City decision appears to conform with early prece-
dents. However, the examiner's decision created widespread contro-
versy in the produce industry in dictum which suggested that the
broker became a purchaser when fruit was invoiced to him for re-
billing in connection with pool-car shipments which were to be divided
between a number of different ultimate customers. Haines labeled this
practice an economic necessity to avoid multi-billing to ultimate cus-
tomers. However, the examiner stated:
We believe that when a seller sells a so-called "pool-car" shipment,
ostensibly through a broker to a number of persons unknown to
the seller, and in every respect concerning that shipment, deals with
the broker as though the broker were himself the true purchaser, the
transaction is ambiguous, and therefore imposes upon the seller the
duty of determining the true facts as to who is his real customer.
The ambiguity of such a transaction arises from the comparatively
recent practice among sellers in the citrus-fruit industry, when mak-
ing pool-car sales, of billing the broker and receiving payment from
the broker, instead of the old, immemorial practice of billing the
actual purchasers direct, receiving payment from them for the mer-
chandise, and thereafter paying the broker his fee. In this recent
3.7 Id. at 505.
138 58 F.T.C. 815 (1961).
139 Id. at 818.
140 Id. at 820. Subsequently, the appeal of Haines was dismissed, and the examiner's
decision became final.
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practice, as employed by Respondents herein, a pool-car transaction
has all the appearance, from the seller's standpoint, of a sale to a
broker for his own account, on which the payment of brokerage is
prohibited by law.141
Needless to say, this broad dictum causes needless doubt as to
whether the Commission had adopted tests which vary substantially
from normal criteria of purchase and sale. However, subsequent Com-
mission complaints against some 75 respondents in the citrus fruit
industry did not result in a single holding expressing acceptance of
the examiner's unorthodox dictum.'4
The citrus fruit investigation produced one Commission proceed-
ing which reached the courts, viz., Western Fruit Growers Sales Co.
43
In that case, the Commission held the seller had violated section 2 (c)
of the Robinson-Patman Act by allowing brokerage on purchases which
so-called brokers made from their own account. The Ninth Circuit
subsequently affirmed on the ground that the administrative findings
were supported by substantial evidence.4 Although the buying brokers
in that case did re-invoice their customers, the court did not sanction
any broad rule that would label as a buyer any person who re-invoiced.
Instead, it carefully based its decision upon the overall factual panoply
detailed in the administrative proceeding. Significant facts proven by
complaint counsel were: (1) the buying brokers invoiced their cus-
tomers at prices substantially above the seller's invoice and kept the
profit, (2) the broker did not bill petitioner for losses when goods were
sold at a lower price than the seller's invoice, (3) the sellers did not
check the invoice prices by the broker to see that the broker was bill-
ing at the seller's price, (4) standard brokers' memoranda of sale were
not issued in the majority of transactions, (5) the seller conceded that
he never had any interest in the transaction after the merchandise was
shipped and "that it was a completed transaction" at the time the
merchandise was shipped and the billing was sent, (6) merchandise
141 Id. at 821-22.
142 On March 8, 1960, the Commission adopted a resolution titled "Resolution
Directing Investigation of the Payment of Brokerage or Commissions or Allowances In
Lieu Thereof by Corporations Engaged in the Sale and Shipment of Fresh Citrus Fruit."
Pursuant thereto, many citrus fruit suppliers, brokers, and distributors dealing in Florida,
Texas, and California citrus fruit were ordered to file special reports pertaining to their
activities. Complaints were issued against a number of these companies charging sub-
stantially the same violations of law set forth in the Haines City Citrus Growers Ass'n
case. Some 75 companies entered into cease and desist orders. See, e.g., cases cited supra
note 105.
143 61 F.T.C. 586, 587-88 (1962) (Complaint).
144 Western Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 907 (1964).
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was shipped directly to the broker rather than the customer, and (7)
the seller did not know the customer's name and made no attempt to
find the customer's name. 45
A good deal of the confusion arising from the proceedings against
the citrus fruit shippers, including the Haines City and Western Fruit
Growers cases, has now been dispelled by the Commission's decision in
Flotill Prods., Inc.146 As previously discussed, the Flotill case involved
the question of whether Flotill had allowed discounts in lieu of broker-
age to a buyer. However, that proceeding also involved the question of
whether certain field brokers purporting to act as representatives of
Flotill were in fact purchasing for their own account and receiving
brokerage on these purchases. After a full trial, the Commission held
that Flotill had not violated section 2 (c) by paying brokerage to field
brokers on purchases for their own account. The opinion of Commis-
sioner Dixon distinguishes the field broker relationship from such
a case as Western Fruit Growers by stating that "these field brokers
do not purchase for their own account but function as [sales] inter-
mediaries on behalf of Flotill." 47
In reaching this conclusion, Commissioner Dixon stressed the fol-
lowing factors in the operation of Flotill's field brokers: (a) purchasers
are generally located at considerable distances from suppliers; (b) the
field broker is in the area of the purchaser and is able to make poten-
tial purchasers aware of information concerning production capabilities
and stock availability; (c) the field broker splits up orders between
several small carriers and organizes the shipping of each canner's share
to purchasers; (d) the field broker receives a commission usually at
the rate of 4 or 5 percent; (e) the field broker usually bills at the price
set by the seller; (f) goods are shipped directly to the ultimate pur-
chasers, never to the field broker; and (g) the purchaser may borrow
money on the goods after they are shipped, but the field broker may
not.
One of the most important aspects of the Flotill decision is the
holding that a broker does become a purchaser if he is invoiced by the
145 However, beyond these facts, it should be emphasized that the Western Fruit
Growers Sales Co. stipulated on the record that "sales were made to the brokers on
account" but that "while such purchases were in the broker's name, they were for
customers of such brokers on a pool basis." See Western Fruit Growers Sales Co., 61
F.T.C. 586, 590 (1962). This and respondent's concession that they regarded the transac-
tion as completed at the time of billing and delivery constituted strong evidence of pur-
chase and sale. Record, pp. 10, 11, 25-27, 113-14.
146 Supra note 126.
147 Supra note 126, at 22037.
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seller and re-invoices for the accommodation of the seller. 4 This clari-
fies doubt created by the Haines City dictum.
Additionally, the Commission realistically appraises the billing
functions of the broker when it holds that the broker might in some
instances re-invoice at a higher price than that set by the seller without
forfeiting his broker status. While a few instances were disclosed in
which field brokers billed the purchaser at slightly higher prices than
the Flotill billing, such instances were held to be not typical, and in-
sufficient to demonstrate that the field broker purchased for his own
account. 49
The decision in the Flotill case in effect recognizes the legislative
intent that arbitrary rules are not to be invoked to convert a broker
into a purchaser for purposes of imposing liability under section
2 (c).10 The intent of the parties is determinative of whether a pur-
chase has taken place.' 51 In future cases, it is to be hoped that the
148 The propriety of brokers' invoicing is also confirmed by the new trade rules
for the fresh fruit and vegetable industry. Section VII of rule 2 states:
A broker negotiates a valid and binding contract for the sale to several
buyers of fresh fruits or vegetables on behalf of his seller-principal at a price
established by the seller. The seller delivers an invoice and/or manifest to the
broker showing the name of the broker as "broker" and itemizing the list of
the merchandise together with the price of each item. The names of the buyers
are not listed. As a service to his seller-principal, the broker bills and collects
from the buyers the amount charged by the seller, remitting the total amount
collected, less brokerage, together with a memorandum of sale identifying the
buyers. There is no violation of Section I of Rule 2 in this example. In such
a situation wherein the names of the buyers are not initially disclosed by the
broker to his seler-principal it is the broker's responsibility to provide con-
firmation and memoranda as will clearly establish his role as a broker, and
it is the seller's responsibility to ascertain that the broker is not the buyer.
149 However, it was also noted that, if the evidence established that "a field
broker customarily bills purchasers at a price higher than he pays Flotill," such fact
might well support the finding that the field broker was purchaser for his own account.
150 "[Tlhe bill does not affect legitimate brokerage either directly or indirectly.
Where the broker renders service to the buyer or to the seller the bill does not prohibit
the payment of brokerage. It is not aimed at the legitimate practice of brokerage, because
brokerage is necessary. The broker has a field all his own and he should not be interfered
with." 80 Cong. Rec. 6281 (1936) (Remarks by Senator Logan). See Students Book
Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
988 (1956); Loren Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Clark Mfg. Co., Civil No. 58C 229 (memoran-
dum opinion April 16, 1965, ND. Ill.). Both held that, in a Robinson-Patman case, the
general law of sales is applicable to determine whether the relationship of the parties
was that of "buyer and seller" or "principal and agent."
151 One of the elements universally recognized as essential to a sale is the intention
of the parties thereto that a sale, as distinguished from any other transaction, shall
result. See, e.g., Adams v. Herman, 106 Cal. App. 2d 92, 234 P.2d 695 (1951); Borlund
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Commission will continue to follow this rule of reason approach which
recognizes that single factors such as the broker's setting his own
price, 15 possession of the merchandise,15  and invoicing5 4 are not in
themselves determinative of the issue of passage of title.
C. Cooperative and Other Group Purchasing Programs Under Sec-
tion 2(c)
The Federal Trade Commission has been quick to attack coopera-
tive purchasing ventures under section 2 (c) of the Robinson-Patman
Act as well as under section 2 (f).
v. Nevada Bank, 99 Cal. 89, 33 Pac. 737 (1893); Boden v. Hunter, 240 Ky. 138, 41
S.W.2d 920 (1931); Allison v. Whitcomb, 289 Mich. 80, 286 N.W. 165, 167 (1939);
Pettoway v. Commercial Automotive Serv., 49 Wash. 2d 650, 306 P.2d 219 (1957);
City and County v. United States, 106 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1939).
152 The fact that the agent was allowed to set his own price after receipt of the
invoice and keep the profit which he realized is not necessarily indicative of a purchase
and sale transaction. Indeed, in commercial law, consignments wherein the consignee had
the right to set his own price had been recognized for many years. For instance, in
Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522 (1913), the contract involved provided
that the so-called consignee's compensation was to be "the difference between the
invoice prices and the selling prices of the goods . . . ." The consignee had power to
sell the goods at such prices as he could obtain "and to immediately pay over to the
said party of the first part any amount collected as aforesaid, immediately upon its
collection .... " The Supreme Court found this to be a valid agency arrangement. Id.
at 523-24. Indeed, the Restatement of Agency states in regard to the factor of the
agent's right to sell as his own set price:
[This factor is not determinative, since an agent may be allowed to fix the
selling price and keep the difference as compensation. Restatement (Second),
Agency § 14J, comment b(3) (1958).
See In re Klein, 3 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1924); Waysey v. Whitcomb, 167 Mich. 58, 132
N.W. 572 (1911). See also Edgewood Shoe Factories v. Stewart, 107 F.2d 123, 125 n.2
(1939), where the consignment agreement fixed the value of the shoes at the invoice
price and the commissions of the consignee at the amounts he received over and above
that price. An ancient and respected authority on this question is Ex parte Bright, 10
Ch. D. 566 (1879), in which the master of the rolls held that an agreement to remunerate
an agent by a commission varying according to the amount of the profit obtained by
the agent in selling the goods did not make the agent a purchaser of the goods.
153 The fact that the seller's distribution pattern involves his taking possession of the
merchandise does not by itself establish a sale. At common law the courts have long
recognized that a consignment is purely an agency transaction although the agent has
possession of the merchandise. Indeed, such agency arrangements have been recognized
for antitrust purposes. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); Students
Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 988 (1956).
154 Consignments have long been recognized as valid agency arrangements even
though the consignee is invoiced by the consignor. See, e.g., Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312
(1893); Edgewood Shoe Factories v. Stewart, 107 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1939); Waysey
v. Whitcomb, 167 M~ich. 58, 132 N.W. 572 (1911).
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As in the case of proceedings under 2(f), the Commission's early
decisions held that purchaser-owned entities had no functional inde-
pendence or status under the Robinson-Patman Act. When such pur-
chaser-controlled entities received brokerage or discounts in lieu of
brokerage from suppliers and refunded such brokerage to their pur-
chasing owners, the Commission held that a violation of section 2 (c)
was established. 15 5 The courts upheld the Commission's initial attack
upon purchaser-controlled brokerage organizations. In 1940 the First
Circuit condemned the payment of commission to a cooperative buying
and service corporation whose stock was owned by wholesale bakers.'56
The Seventh Circuit followed with decisions against purchaser-con-
trolled membership organizations in 1945 in the Modern Marketing
Serv. case,'5" and in 1953 in the Independent Grocers Alliance case. 5 8
As in the section 2 (f) cases, the critical factor in the Commission's
eyes was the ownership and control exercised by the group members
over the intermediaries which they created. Under such circumstances,
a seller's payment of brokerage to the intermediary was deemed by the
Commission to be illegal.
5 9
The Commission and court decisions were rendered without refer-
ence to the nature of the services performed by buying cooperatives and
other groups in the food industry. They ignored the basic economic fact
that buying groups of small purchasers, through the use of private label
merchandise, constituted an effective countervailing power against the
development of the chain stores. The development of private labels by
small independent purchasers provided a ready market for smaller
suppliers' products. Group advertising programs and the wide distri-
bution of the products by the participating stores gave such labels a
nationally accepted name, and they were an undoubted service to the
suppliers. Apart from alleviating small buyers of expense of individ-
ually maintaining brokers throughout the country, the group programs
further benefited the supplier by guaranteeing credit and eliminating
collection expense. Moreover, the proliferation of such group buying
organizations diminished the dependence of each private label pro-
ducer on any particular distributive organization, whether cooperative,
voluntary, or corporate.6 °
155 Independent Grocers Alliance Distrib. Co., 48 F.T.C. 894 (1952); National
Modes, Inc., 46 F.T.C. 404 (1950); Modem Marketing Serv., Inc., 37 F.T.C. 386 (1943);
Quality Bakers of America, 28 F.T.C. 1507 (1939).
156 Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940).
157 Modem Marketing Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
158 Independent Grocers Alliance Distrib. Co. v. FTC, 203 F.2d 941, 945 (7th Cir.
1953).
159 See, e.g., Quality Bakers of America, supra note 155, at 1523.
160 See Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 115-17 (1959).
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Such policy considerations would seem to be relevant to the ser-
vices rendered exemption in section 2 (c). However, the Commission
and the courts uniformly refused to apply this exemption in group
buying cases. Representative of these is the First Circuit decision in
the Quality Bakers case, where the services rendered exemption was
rejected. The court said, "even if the service company here renders
services to the sellers . . , it cannot lawfully collect brokerage fees
from the sellers since it is acting as agent for the purchasers."''
Thus, the three early circuit court opinions, plus Commission deci-
sions that did not reach the courts, seemed to preclude taking advan-
tage of the benefits of group purchasing programs.
However, in 1959 in the Brock case the Supreme Court cast doubt
on the validity of these interpretations.'62 Indeed, the Court intimated
that brokerage to a group organization could be justified if "its methods
of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price by means of a re-
duced brokerage charge."16 8
The harvest of the Brock Court language was not long in coming.
It is typified by the result in a proceeding which the Federal Trade
Commission instituted in 1958 against Central Retailer-Owned Gro-
cers, 164 a membership organization made up of retailer-owned whole-
sale grocers which obtained for them so-called allowances and discounts
from suppliers.
When instituted, the Central Retailer-Owned Grocers case did not
seem on its face to present any novel or unique problems under prior
decisional law. The facts fell into the traditional mold: the cooperative
group purchasing organization received and transmitted to its pur-
chaser owners allowances on the purchases which these owners had
made. Thirty-five wholesale grocers organized Central to act as an
intermediary in bargaining with suppliers in connection with the pur-
chase of private brand food and grocery products. The following facts
are pertinent: (1) Central was wholly-owned by its customers, i.e.,
the wholesale grocer members; (2) Profits of Central after the deduc-
tion of operation expenses, were distributed as patronage dividends to
its customers in accordance with their purchases; (3) Each customer
contributed a deposit to Central to enable it to finance its operation;
(4) Central dealt only in private label merchandise (the private labels
were owned by a sister corporation) which it sold only to its stock-
161 Quality Bakers of America, supra note 156, at 399.
162 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
163 363 U.S. at 173.
164 National Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1208 (1962) (Complaint).
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holder-members; (5) Central's articles of incorporation showed that
its sole purpose was to be a "purchasing organization for the member
retail grocers . . . ." and that it was to "effect such savings by bulk
purchasing and distribute such savings to the member retail grocers,
on a patronage basis of purchases"; (6) Each stockholder was a direc-
tor of Central; (7) At the beginning of each season, the members sub-
mitted to Central estimates of how much private label merchandise
they would need during the ensuing year. The advance estimates were
prepared on forms distributed by Central to its members; (8) Central
negotiated directly with suppliers on behalf of its members and entered
into long-term purchase contracts with them; (9) All merchandise was
drop-shipped by the suppliers direct to the members of Central; and
(10) Suppliers were informed that they would realize savings from
Central's advance commitments from members.
The Commission found that the member wholesalers had utilized
the cooperative buying organization as agent to secure private label
goods for the members. 6 ' Using the mathematical similarity test,
the Commission treated the discount received as being "in lieu of bro-
kerage,"' 6 and held each of the members liable for the receipt of the
brokerage through the purchaser-controlled entity.16
7
In the proceeding before the Commission, Central had raised the
defense that it was in fact a purchaser, taking title to merchandise and
reselling to its stockholder owners. The Commission ruled that Central
was nothing but a buyer-controlled intermediary. 6 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed, overturning the Commission's finding that
Central was the buying agent for its members and flatly holding that
Central was not a broker but was a purchaser purchasing on its own
account and reselling to its stockholder-owners.0 9 The court said:
The record convincingly shows that the payments made by Central
to its suppliers were for merchandise which it bought upon its own
credit and not on orders of its members transmitted to its suppliers.
The fact that Central, because of its strong purchasing power, was
able to buy at favorable prices or on discounts and allowances by its
suppliers, is not proof that Central was rendering a broker service.170
The holding that a purchaser-owned entity involved in obtaining
merchandise which is 100 percent drop-shipped to its owners is itself
165 Ibid.
166 Id. at 1238.
167 Id. at 1240.
168 Id. at 1233-35.
169 Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
170 Id. at 414.
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a purchaser seems contrary to all the early Commission precedents
under both section 2 (c) and section 2 (f). Apparently, without express
elaboration, the Seventh Circuit took belated notice of the policy be-
hind the statute and the economic implications of the services rendered
clause. Indeed, the court resoundingly affirmed the principle that small
buyers may combine their purchasing power for their own protection.
The court recognized that
Central was able to secure favorable prices from its suppliers, be-
cause of (1) their assured volume of business, (2) their lack of any
credit risk, (3) a reduction in their billing work, and (4) Central's
advance commitments for later requirements.... Reason does not
permit our ignoring these facts in order to declare illegal a worthy
effort by a number of wholesale grocers, owned by retailers . . . .
which made them stronger in their competition with large chain
stores.17'
What the future holds for purchaser-controlled groups; however,
remains a subject for speculation. In spite of its recognition of the
services performed by such groups, the Seventh Circuit has now added
further confusion to an already complex picture by holding in the
National Parts Warehouse case that an automotive jobber-controlled
entity was not to be accorded the independent functional status of a
warehouse distributor purchaser. 72 In that case, the respondents had
vehemently argued that the Central precedent required classifying the
customer-owned entity as a "purchaser" in its own right for section
2 (a) and 2 (f) purposes. However, this argument was rejected with a
statement that the Central case had been submitted to the court only
on the theory that "sums Central received and accepted from certain
of its suppliers constituted brokerage or allowances in lieu of bro-
kerage .... 3,17
Seemingly, the public policy behind the services rendered exemp-
tion in section 2 (c) has been recognized in the Central Retailer-Owned
Grocers case, and this exemption will provide protection to group buy-
ing ventures under that per se section which is not available under
section 2(f).
171 Id. at 414-15. Moreover, the court strongly commended a dissenting opinion,
at the Commission level, by Commissioner Ehnan, and criticized the Commission's
majority opinion, stating that the majority would "drive such groups out of existence."
Id. at 415.
172 General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965).
173 346 F.2d at 317. See also Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 401
(7th Cir. 1965), where the court made the same comment in rejecting the argument
that a jobber-owned warehouse distributor was entitled to the status of a "purchaser"
in its own right in a § 2 (a) case.
[Vol. 27
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
D. Defenses in Proceedings Against Buyers Under Section 2 (c)
1. Services Rendered
As previously stated, the early Commission decisions virtually
wrote the "services rendered" clause out of section 2(c) as a de-
fense.17 4 However, contemporary authorities demonstrate a radical
change in the judicial climate and a realistic reappraisal of the "services
rendered" clause in the context of marketing conditions in the food
industry wherein the Commission has concentrated its 2 (c) enforce-
ment efforts.
In particular, the Commission and the courts have been forced to
reappraise the effect of the "services rendered" exemption in the light
of the Supreme Court decision in FTC v. Henry Brock & Co. 5 In
Brock, the Court found the "services rendered" exception inapplicable
because there was no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to
the seller. However, the Court expressly noted, "we would have quite a
different case if there were such evidence . . 21176
Confirming the vitality of the "services rendered" provision, the
Supreme Court's second Brock decision noted pointedly: "We made it
clear in our prior opinion that the order need not be read as prohibiting
transactions to which the statutory exception [for services rendered]
applies."'1 77
While the favorable decisions in Hruby Distrib. Co., 78 and Cen-
tral Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC,79 were both based on the
fact that the respondent was a purchaser, the opinions in both cases
emphasize the fact that the challenged parties performed valuable eco-
nomic services for their suppliers.8 0 Moreover, while the Flotill Prods.,
Inc. decision seems predicated on the determination of whether field
brokers were purchasers, certain language in the Dixon opinion points
to a recognition that the substantial services rendered by the field
broker might have been sufficient to exempt the transactions from 2 (c)
liability even if a purchase had been made by these brokers.' 8 '
174 Southgate Brokerage Co., 39 F.T.C. 166 (1944); Modern Marketing Serv., Inc.,
37 F.T.C. 386 (1943); see Biddle Purchasing Co., 25 F.T.C. 564 (1937).
17r 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
176 Id. at 173-74.
177 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367 n.8 (1962).
178 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
179 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
180 As one commentator has recently noted: "Owing to Broch, therefore, the 'for
services rendered' issue may be reopened for fresh scrutiny of the validity of prior inter-
pretations . . . .. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 351
(1962).
181 Commissioner Dixon stated:
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Commissioner Elman's separate opinion, on the other hand,
squarely ruled that even a controlled intermediary or purchaser may
receive brokerage if he in fact renders substantial services for the
seller.'82
In Garrett-Holmes Co., 8 3 the hearing examiner noted the revitali-
zation of the "services rendered" clause, quoting Broch extensively.
However, the examiner held that the services performed were not
"characteristically those of a broker, but are rather characteristically
those of any intermediary in the line of distribution."'8 4 In such cir-
cumstances, the examiner refused to recognize the "services rendered"
exemption, stating that "to allow such 'services' to constitute justifica-
tion for brokerage would negate 2 (c) completely." 8 5 However, he did
state that, if the services rendered had been "above and beyond those
rendered by efficient wholesalers in the chain of distribution," the
brokerage paid to the buyer might have been justified.8 6 The final
order of the Commission confirmed this analysis by quoting Brock to
the effect that "there is no evidence that the buyer rendered any ser-
vices to the sellers ... nor that anything in its method of dealing justi-
fied its getting a discriminatory price as brokerage." 87
Viewed as a part of the entire transaction from the time of the placing of the
order by the ultimate purchaser until delivery of the goods to him, we find
that technical title passage, if such be the case, would not be conclusive but
would be merely incidental to the services performed by the field broker for
the canner.
Flotill Prods., Inc., supra note 126, at 22037.
182 Citing Brock, Hruby, and Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Commissioner Elman
stated:
The effect of these decisions has been to restore Section 2(c) to its proper
role in the scheme of the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2(c) prohibits only
three general types of transaction. The first is the payment of unearned broker-
age to a dummy who renders no services and is controlled by the other party
to the transaction. A variation of this would be where the dummy, in an
attempt to mask a violation of the statute, performs only slight or nominal
services which do not entitle him to brokerage. In the second type of trans-
action to which 2(c) applies, the dummy is dispensed with entirely. The seller
grants directly to the buyer an allowance or discount for, on account of, or in
lieu of, brokerage, and no services are rendered by the buyer to the seller
1 justifying the allowance, and no savings in distribution costs are effected.
Flotill Prods., Inc., supra note 126, at 22047 (separate opinion).
183 Trade Reg. Rep. f[ 17209 (Feb. 26, 1965).
184 Id. at 22280.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid. This statement provoked an objection by Commissioner MacIntyre, who
wrote a separate opinion to the effect that the majority's reference to services rendered
is "wholly unnecessary and unwarranted."
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As a final judicial step in recognition of the "services rendered"
clause, the Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp. case 88
flatly recognizes that a buyer may receive brokerage for services that
he performs. The court emphasized that, even if the defendants were
buyers, the fact that they brought other buyers and sellers together
for a commission and sold at the manufacturer's stipulated price was
a service which negated a violation of section 2 (c). However, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that "reselling at
American's list price is not a service" and that in fact there was no
evidence that the favored customers brought "buyer and seller to-
gether."'"" Significantly, the Court of Appeals did not disagree with
the District Court's ruling that the services rendered clause provides
an absolute defense for a buyer's receipt of brokerage. Instead, it based
its ruling on a factual determination that no additional services had
actually been rendered by the buyer. 90
The one note which adds considerable confusion to this favorable
and logical development in litigated cases was the promulgation of the
Federal Trade Commission's new Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh
Fruit and Vegetable Industry. Unfortunately, those rules omit any
reference to "service rendered" in dealing with the liability of buyers
for receipt of brokerage and discounts in lieu of brokerage. However,
the Federal Trade Commission at the time of the promulgation of these
rules said that they are "consistent in all respects with the pertinent
court decisions . . . ,,'o' Since the recent court decisions have given
increasing recognition to the "services rendered'" clause, it is arguable
that the Commission will not return to its previous narrow position.'
188 238 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
189 Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., CCH 1965 Trade Cas.
1[ 71632, at 81841 (2d Cir. 1965). Circuit judge Moore dissented on the ground that
the discriminatory discounts involved did not reflect a reduction in brokerage, and
hence were beyond the scope of section 2(c) because they were proximately caused
by "the performance of legitimate distribution functions and services." Id. at 81845.
190 Cf. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., CCH 1965 Trade Cas.
fJ 71583 (9th Cir. 1965), recognizing the renewed vitality of the services rendered
exemption, but holding that services performed by a buyer's agent which were against
the buyer's interest would not provide the seller a defense when he was charged with
bribing the buyer's agent.
191 "F.T.C. Promulgates Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable
Industry," at 2.
192 But see the statement of Commissioner Maclntyre approving the new rules on
the ground that they "are substantially improved and differ in a number of important
and significant respects from the rules to which .. . [he] objected as originally pro-
posed." The originally proposed rules had contained a reference to "services rendered"
in the clause dealing with brokerage.
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2. Absence of Discrimination
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in the Southgate case inter-
jected early confusion to the law of section 2 (c) by stating that a show-
ing of "discrimination . . . is not necessary to a violation . ... "I"
Hence, subsequent decisions emphasized the fact that, while a showing
of a favored and disfavored customer was a prerequisite to a violation
of section 2 (a) or 2 (f), no such showing was necessary where a buyer
was charged with receiving brokerage or discounts in lieu of broker-
age.19
4
In part, the Southgate rationale appears to arise from a misunder-
standing of the statutory purport of section 2 (c). Admittedly, section
2 (c) does not require a showing of injury to competition. However,
this is not to say that the legislative scheme can be carried out without
the showing of discrimination between two buyers. It is interesting to
note that the Southgate decision relies primarily on an earlier deci-
sion in the Oliver case 95 for the proposition that a showing of discrimi-
nation is not necessary. In fact the court in that earlier case held simply
that the brokerage ban under subsection 2 (c) stood apart from the price
discrimination ban under 2 (a) and that there was no reason to read
into 2 (c) the competitive injury requirement of 2 (a). Yet, that court
recognized that subsection 2(c), like subsections 2(d) and 2(e), en-
acted as a supplement to subsection 2 (a), aimed at schemes whereby
buyers received disguised price discriminations. The court pointed out
that a buyer receiving sham brokerage obtains a "concealed advantage"
over a buyer not accorded such payment. The court said, "it was this
sort of discrimination, we think, which was the purpose of this section
of the act to forbid."' 9
However, the Supreme Court's Brock decision recognized that
section 2 (c) was directed at all means "by which brokerage could be
used to effect price discrimination.' 97 As one commentator states, the
Broch case superimposed the criterion of "discrimination" on section
2(c).198 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized
the legislative history of the Act, stating: "The Robinson-Patman Act
was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which large
193 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 609 (4th Cir. 1945).
194 See, e.g., FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir.
1959); Venus Foods, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1025 (1960).
195 Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
196 Id. at 771. See also Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687, 692 (2d Cir.
1938).
197 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 170 (1960).
198 See Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 344 (1962).
See also Comment, "Beleaguered Brokers," 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1308, 1318 (1964).
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buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue
of their greater purchasing power." 199
The effect of the Court's emphasis on discrimination as a pre-
requisite to a violation of 2 (c) upon the Federal Trade Commission
has yet to be fully assessed. However, in the Hruby case the majority
opinion stressed the absence of discrimination, noting that the respond-
ent Hruby was a purchaser at a higher level than disfavored wholesalers
and that his receipt of functional compensation involved "no potential
anti-competitive effect" inasmuch as he "did not compete at the whole-
sale level." 20 Similarly, in the Garrett-Holmes case, the hearing ex-
aminer's initial decision stressed the fact that the buyer respondent
competed with wholesalers for the trade of retail customers and em-
phasized the "higher cost incurred by respondent's wholesaler-com-
petitors in receiving the ten cent brokerage.) 20 1
On balance, it appears that the recent proceedings again recognize
the important economic reality that rigid enforcement of section 2 (c)
accomplishes no justifiable end in the absence of discriminatory con-
duct.
3. Knowledge
The early Commission decisions under section 2(c) substantially
predate the Supreme Court's landmark decision in the Automatic
Canteen case. Little consideration is given to the aspect of the buyer's
knowledge of receipt of prohibited brokerage or discounts in lieu of
brokerage 202 However, the Supreme Court's decision in Brock strongly
indicated the relevance of knowledge in the case of a buyer charged
with violation of section 2 (c), although holding that such knowledge
199 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., supra note 197, at 168. See also statement by Senator
Logan, chairman of the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee considering
the proposed drafts of § 2(c), to the effect "that the purposes sought to be accomplished
by this bill shall be carried out, which are that false brokerage as a means of price dis-
crimination must be ended." s0 Cong. Rec. 6287 (1936).
200 Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1429, 1448 (1962).
201 Garrett-Holmes Co., supra note 183, at 22168. See also Empire Rayon Yam
Co. v. American Viscose Corp., CCH 1965 Trade Cas. if 71632, at 81842, holding that
section 2(c) is aimed at "brokerage devices for the concealment of price discriminations."
Cf. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., CCH 1965 Trade Cas. if 71583 (9th
Cir. 1965), stating that "although discrimination would appear now to be relevant in
reduced commission cases, it does not follow that it is now an essential element in
cases involving the outright payment of unearned brokerage."
202 However, in several decisions courts of appeals have stressed both the seller's
and buyer's knowledge that payments made by the sellers to purported intermediaries
were in fact handed back to the buyer in an effort to evade the statute. See, e.g., Great
AUt. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939); Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC,
102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938).
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was not necessary in the case of the seller's broker charged with re-
bating part of his commission to a buyer. The Court said that "the
buyer's intent might be relevant were he charged with receiving an
allowance in violation of § 2(c). ))203
The Commission's decisions have not discussed in great length
the all-important requirement of knowledge. For instance, in Thomas-
ville Chair, the Commission acknowledged that in a seller case under
section 2(c), "evidence with respect to the intent of such person may
be relevant in a proceeding under the subsection," but stated that there
was no requirement that the complaint counsel demonstrate knowl-
edge.2 °4
In the Eidson Produce Co. case, the hearing examiner held that
"scienter of the buyer is not an essential element of proof in the Com-
mission's case under 2(c).'05 However, on appeal the Commission
recognized the application of Automatic Canteen to section 2(c) by
directing that this language be stricken from the initial decision and
by entering findings that the respondent buyers "either knew or should
have known that they were receiving a discount or allowance in lieu
of brokerage." 06
The knowledge issue was directly raised by the briefs in the Hruby
case,"07 but the Commission's decision that Hruby was a purchaser who
received functional discounts rather than brokerage made it unneces-
sary to deal with the question of knowledge. However, the result in
Hruby may be a tacit recognition of an intermediary's good faith in
a confused marketing and legal situation.
Any caveat emptor rule that knowledge is not required for a buyer
liability under 2 (c) would offend not only ordinary standards of due
process and fairness, but would also offend basic antitrust principles
and would in no way advance the objectives of the Robinson-Patman
Act. Admittedly, the buyer may face substantial difficulties in deter-
mining whether a discount is "in lieu of brokerage," when a purchase
has taken place, and whether he can belong to a buying group. Failure
to take these facts into consideration can only result in a radical cur-
tailment of beneficial competition.
Moreover, the failure to include "knowledge" expressly within the
language of 2 (c) is hardly determinative in a statute where "precision
203 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., supra note 197, at 174.
204 Thomasville Chair Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 29510, at 37811 (March 15, 1961).
205 Eidson Produce Co., 60 F.T.C. 1, 7 (1962).
206 -d. at 9.
207 Respondent's Exceptions to Initial Decision and Supporting Brief, pp. 24-30,
Hruby Distrib. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8068, Dec. 26, 1962.
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of expression is not an outstanding characteristic,"1208 and where the
Commission has elsewhere found "inadvertent" omissions.20 9
III. BuYER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMIssION ACT
While sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act ex-
pressly apply only to sellers, the Federal Trade Commission has ex-
panded the "unfair practices" prohibitions of section 5210 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act to encompass the buyer's receipt of benefits
which he knew would violate Robinson-Patman sections 2(d) and
(e). 2 Indeed, in some nine cases during the 1960's, the Commission
has held that the knowing receipt of such promotional benefits consti-
tutes a violation of section 5212
While the issue has not been finally settled by the Supreme Court,
several courts of appeals have affirmed this extension of section 5. For
instance, in a proceeding under section 5 attacking the receipt by a
buyer of promotional allowances in violation of section 2(d), the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed a Commission order.213 In finding that section 5
covered the knowing receipt of discriminatory promotional allowances,
the court noted:
There seems to be no specific reason why Congress omitted buyers
from the coverage of Section 2 (d) while including them under Sec-
tions 2(c) and (f); the omission was more inadvertent than
studious. Certainly buyers were not let out because Congress favored
them or wished to permit them to engage in activity proscribed to
sellers.214
More importantly, the court held that the Commission was not re-
quired to prove injury to competition as an element of a section 5
208 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953).
209 See, e.g., Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960).
210 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
211 38 Stat. 73 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d) & (e) (1964).
212 See RE. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); Giant Food, Inc.
v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1962) ; American News
Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Grand Union v.
FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); Santa's Playthings, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. 9 16873
(April 3, 1964); Individualized Catalogs, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16873 (April 3, 1964);
ATD Catalogs, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. f[ 16874 (April 3, 1964); Billy and Ruth Promo-
tion, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16875 (April 3, 1964); Fred Meyer, Inc., Trade Reg.
Rep. ff 16500 (July 9, 1963).
213 Grand Union v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). One of the sellers involved
in the Grand Union promotion was held to have violated § 2(d) in Swanee Paper Corp.
v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961).
214 Id. at 96. See also REH. Macy & Co. v. FTC, supra note 212; Giant Food, Inc.
v. FTC, supra note 212; American News Co. v. FTC, supra note 212.
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violation because section 2 (d) provided a per se test of illegal conduct
by the seller.215 Thus, the Commission was allowed to avoid the usual
requirement that it prove competitive impact in a section 5 proceeding
brought with respect to acts which are not made per se illegal by statute,
or acts which have not previously been held illegal because they are
characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression. 216 Possibly
encouraged by this ruling, the Commission seems to have accelerated
its efforts in attacking buyers under section 5. Unlike the current pro-
ceedings under 2(f) and 2(c), which have been largely confined to
the automotive replacement and food industries, the Commission has
not limited its section 5 enforcement efforts to any particular industry.
Rather, section 5 has been used in proceedings brought with respect
to the activities of buyers in such diverse fields as supermarkets,217
retail newsstands, s retail department stores,219 and toy jobber dis-
tributors.220 In contrast with the Commission's reluctance to enforce
section 2 (f) against single buyers, it has recently made a concentrated
attack against such buyers under section 5.221
215 Grand Union v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1962).
216 The scope of § 5's prohibition against "unfair methods of competition" was first
enunciated by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1920):
The words "unfair method(s] of competition" are not defined by the statute,
and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the Commission,
ultimately to determine as matter of law what they include. They are clearly
inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals
because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression, or as against
public policy because of their dangerous tendency -unduly to hinder competition
or create monopoly. The act was certainly not intended to fetter free and fair
competition as commonly understood and practiced by honorable opponents in
trade.
(Emphasis added.)
The basic requirement of proof of actual or probable injury to competition in § 5
cases was again asserted by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising
Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). There, the Court held that under § 5 the primary issue
was "the impact of the particular practice on competition, not the label that it carries."
Id. at 397. (Emphasis added.)
217 See, e.g., Grand Union v. FTC, supra note 212.
218 See, e.g., American News Co. v. FTC, supra note 212.
219 See, e.g., R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, supra note 212.
220 See, e.g., Santa's Playthings, Inc., supra note 212.
221 Nevertheless, the Commission has not ignored group activity under § 5. It has
instituted three proceedings attacking toy jobbers who own stock in catalog companies
receiving promotional benefits which are allegedIy in violation of § 2(d), on the theory
that such benefits are not available on proportionally equal terms to jobbers who are
not stockholders. See ATD Catalogs, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. II 16874 (April 3, 1964);
Individualized Catalog's, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16873 (April 3, 1964); Santa's Play-
things, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. fI 16873 (April 3, 1964).
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In J. Weingarten, Inc.,2 2 a proceeding involving promotions asso-
ciated with special and anniversary sales, the Commission set out the
"basic factual elements" required to establish a violation of section 5
through knowingly inducing payments violative of section 2 (d) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. These elements are:
(1) The buyer solicited and received in commerce payments
for promotional services in connection with the resale of a supplier's
product;
(2) That at approximately the time of the solicitation and
receipt, other customers of the supplier were competing with the
recipient in the distribution of the grantor-supplier's goods of like
grade and quality;
(3) The payments received by respondents were not affirma-
tively offered by the suppliers to such competing customers on
proportionally equal terms;
(4) Respondent possessed information sufficient to put upon it
the duty of making inquiry to ascertain whether the granting sup-
pliers were making such payments available to its competitors on
proportionally equal terms.2sa
In enunciating these tests, the Commission rejected the notion that
section 5 can be utilized to impose a rigid rule of caveat emptor on the
buyer's receipt of promotional benefits. Indeed, the Commission em-
phasized that each of the above elements must be established with a
meticulous attention to details. Noting in Weingarten the Commission
counsel had failed to introduce evidence showing that "other customers
of the supplier were competing with the recipient in the distribution of
the grantor-supplier's goods," the Commission held that the evidence
failed to establish a violation of section 5.224
While the Weingarten case clearly and concisely outlines the proof
required by the Commission in a section 5 proceeding, other Commis-
sion decisions seem to have obscured it again. Apart from the always
confusing question of "proportional equality," current decisions raise
questions as to (1) when an allowance is to be treated as being given
"for promotional services in connection with the resale of a supplier's
goods," (2) when customers are to be treated as "competing," and
222 Trade Reg. Rep. U 16349 (March 25, 1963).
228 Id. at 21180.
224 The Commission remanded the Weingarten case to the hearing examiner for
further proceedings. Thereupon, the respondent Weingarten brought an action to enjoin
the Commission from further proceedings, alleging a failure to comply with § 6(a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires that the proceeding be completed with
reasonable dispatch. The court enjoined the remand, but allowed the Commission ninety
days in which to enter a final order. J. Weingarten, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 1 70845. The
Commission subsequently dismissed the action while an appeal was pending in the
Fifth Circuit.
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(3) when a respondent will be treated as having the requisite knowl-
edge to establish a violation of section 5. These questions will be con-
sidered in order.
A. Nature of Allowances Given for Promotional Services in Connec-
tion with the Resale of a Supplier's Product
The Commission's early decisions emphasized that a violation of
section 2 (d) can only be established when the challenged allowance is
given in consideration for services and facilities furnished by the buyer
in connection with the resale of the seller's product.2 5 However, a
result of a Commission proceeding against R. H. Macy & Co. subjects
the practical application of this rule to doubt.22 6
In Macy, the Commission attacked allowances which were to be
used for institutional advertising of Macy's 100th Anniversary and not
for promoting the specific supplier's products. Complaint counsel did
not contend that these allowances violated section 2(d). The hearing
examiner held that the practice challenged was not oppressive or coer-
cive and hence it was not per se illegal under previous precedents, and
noting that no injury to competition had been proved, he found for
the respondent. On appeal, the Commission reversed, finding that the
exaction of these allowances had been coercive and that in fact the
record showed a reasonable likelihood of substantial injury to competi-
tion of the type protected by the Robinson-Patman Act.
2 7
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not follow
either the reasoning of the Commission or the examiner. Instead, it held
that the challenged payments were violative of per se prohibitions of
section 2(d) and that the buyer's knowing receipt of the allowances
was a violation of section 5 without proof of injury to competition. The
court stated:
Macy's used the payments for institutional advertising and promo-
tions to get more people into its store to buy the goods of all its
vendors. The payments by the contributing vendors were thus in
consideration for services or facilities furnished by Macy's in con-
nection with the offering for sale of the vendor's goods. 22 8
Thus, the factual issue of whether allowances have been offered
in connection with promotion of the goods of the vendor may be subject
to new tests. However, since the court in Macy went off on grounds not
225 Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co., 59 F.T.C. 693 (1961).
226 R.H. Macy & Co., 60 F.T.C. 1249 (1962).
227 60 F.T.C. at 1258-60.
228 R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Farr's
Inc., Dkt. No. 8581 (opinion Oct. 20, 1965) at 3-4.
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raised or briefed by the parties, the value of the decision as a precedent
is somewhat clouded. Likewise, the exact effect of the Commission's
ruling in future cases involving allowances for institutional advertising
is unclear. However, it still seems clear that proof of a per se violation
of section 5 requires the Commission to prove that the challenged
allowance was used in some way to promote the goods of the vendor
in question.
B. Identity of "Competing" Customers
The question of whether particular customers of a vendor "com-
pete" at the same functional level has received the close attention of
the Commission in 2(a) and 2(f) proceedings. Indeed, the National
Parts Warehouse case reaffirms numerous Commission 2(a) and 2(f)
cases, holding that a wholesaler may receive a better price than a re-
tailer simply because a price benefit to one customer cannot injure the
other when they do not compete for the same class of trade.
The question of whether particular customers are at the same
functional level takes on added significance in a 2 (d) proceeding, for
2 (d) by its own terms bans only allowances which are not available to((competing" customers. No such express requirement of "competition"
between favored and disfavored customers appears in section 2(a).
Indeed, section 2(a) theoretically could permit a proceeding based
on discriminations between customers at different functional levels;
for it prohibits price discriminations between "purchasers"229 where the
effect may be to prevent competition with (a) the person granting the
discrimination, (b) the person knowingly receiving the benefit of the
discrimination, or (c) customers of either of them.3 9
Heretofore, it has been considered well settled under section 2 (d)
that companies which sell to different classes of customers, e.g., con-
sumers and retailers, obviously perform different distributional func-
tions and therefore cannot be deemed "competitors" in the distribution
and sale of the products involved. Thus, in the Liggett & Myers case,231
the Commission held that vending machine operators selling to the
consumer were not competing with wholesalers because they "sell to
229 The terms "purchaser" and "customer" as used in various sections of the
Robinson-Patman Act are synonymous. See generally Austin, Price Discrimination and
Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act (2d ed. 1959).
20 In a proceeding under 2(a), a seller who discriminates in price against a whole-
sale customer and in favor of a direct retail customer may be found to be in violation
of the law where the discrimination adversely affects the ability of the wholesaler's
customers to compete with the favored retailer. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,
55 (1948).
231 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 56 F.T.C. 221 (1959).
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different classes of customers. 232 Moreover, under the standards pre-
viously enunciated by the Commission and courts, a customer is "some-
one who buys directly from the seller or his agent or broker. 2 33 The
one recognized exception to these rulings has arisen in cases involving
so-called "indirect customers," i.e., where the supplier dealt directly
with retailers and controlled the prices or terms at which wholesalers
sold to retailers. However, in Fred Meyer, Inc., the Commission ex-
pressly interpreted section 2 (d) to mean that a seller who offers promo-
tional payments to its retail customers must offer proportionally equal
payments to its wholesale customers when those wholesalers sell to
disfavored competitive retailers. 3 4 In reaching this conclusion the
Commission noted that any other construction of the statute would
leave independent retailers purchasing from wholesalers completely
outside the pale of section 2 (d) of the amended Clayton Act insofar
as their competition with the direct buying chain is concerned. The
Commission argued that only direct buying "chains" would be entitled
to payments under section 2 (d) if it did not expand the meaning of the
term "competing" to encompass wholesalers.
Moreover, the Commission noted that section 2 (a) may prohibit
special prices to retailers not accorded to wholesalers because the
statutory language of section 2(a) prohibits price discriminations
232 Id. at 251. See also Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565, 566, 573 (1956).
Similarly, in Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.Zd 1 (7th Cir. 1949),
the court held that distributors of sugar and industrial users who bought directly from
the refiner could not be deemed to be "customers competing in the distribution of the
commodity." By contrast, a district court held that "Congress intended by Section 2(d)
...to prevent circumvention of the prohibitions of Section 2(a) by the employment
of alternatives for price concessions" and indicated that "violation of Section 2(d) may
occur when a manufacturer gives a retailer an allowance not given to a wholesaler
whose customer competes with the retailer." Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
142 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D.NJ. 1956). This decision was the basis of a dissenting opinion
by Commissioner Kern in the Liggett & Myers case.
233 FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments
and Services, 1 Trade Reg. Rep. if 3980, at 6073 (1960). See, e.g., Tri-Valley Packing
Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 709 (9th Cir. 1964); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d
104, 109 (2d Cir. 1962); K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310 (D.N.Y.
1961); Dayton Rubber Co., Trade Reg. Rep. if 17029 (Aug 5, 1964); Champion Spark
Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
Indeed, even in the Krug case, where a district court indicated that wholesalers and
retailers were entitled to proportionally equal treatment under Section 2(d), there was
a showing that the wholesalers' dealings were controlled by the manufacturers. In Krug,
the wholesalers were only authorized by the manufacturer to sell in certain areas and
to "franchised retailers." This placed the manufacturer in a position of controlling his
distributor's resales.
234 Fred Meyer, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. if 16500 (July 9, 1963).
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
which may injure competition with customers of disfavored pur-
chasers23 5 The Commission concluded that, if 2 (d) was not thus con-
strued to protect wholesalers, it would be possible for suppliers to evade
section 2 (a) by making promotional payments which would have the
same effect as price discrimination.
If affirmed, the Commission's novel interpretation of section 2 (d)
will impose new and harsh burdens upon manufacturers who attempt to
offer promotional allowances to retailers and will increase the buyer's
burden in ascertaining the legality of allowances. At a minimum, it
appears that the holding would require a seller to ascertain the number
of wholesalers in any given area who may have customers that compete
with retailers. Obviously, the holding not only encourages, but requires
manufacturers to assume the burden of scrutinizing their wholesalers'
arrangements with retailers.
However, the primary criticism of the Commission's ruling is its
apparent concern with the language of competition rather than com-
petitive realities. The fact is that the Commission has no authority to
compel the granting of promotional allowances to retailers purchasing
from wholesalers inasmuch as such retailers are not customers of the
manufacturer. 36 Moreover, it is unlikely that many manufacturers
will voluntarily undertake to dictate that wholesalers pass on promo-
tional benefits to their retailers; for there is a substantial question as
to whether such a policy would make the retailer the "indirect cus-
tomer" of the manufacturer 3 7 Indeed, such a policy of requiring the
passing on of promotional benefits would seem to be considered a form
of resale price maintenance in direct violation of the Sherman Act.238
Hence, the Commission's ruling in Fred Meyer provides no real guar-
antee that retailers who compete with favored chains will ever receive
any actual promotional benefits from their wholesale suppliers.
Finally, the beleaguered buyer is now apparently faced with the
dilemma of trying to ascertain whether his retail competitors purchase
from wholesalers and whether these wholesalers have been offered
235 See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 55 (1948).
236 Possibly because of this fact, the Commission order merely requires the buyer
to desist from receiving allowances not available to wholesalers. Commissioner Elman
dissented on the ground that "nothing in the order would require the wholesalers to
pass these allowances on, directly or indirectly, to the retailers who compete with Meyer
and who are the victims of the discrimination." Fred Meyer, Inc., supra note 234.
237 Cj. American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1962).
238 Cf. Dayton Rubber Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 17029 (Aug. 5, 1964), where the
Commission concluded that contracts between warehouse distributors and a manufac-
turer creating an indirect customer relationship by price fixing provisions also constituted
a conspiracy in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
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proportionally equal treatment. Hence, the effect of the Fred Meyer
decision is to place a difficult if not impossible burden on the buyer
without guaranteeing any additional promotional benefits to competing
retailers.
C. Knowledge
Although the statutory language of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act makes no reference to the buyer's knowledge, the
Federal Trade Commission has required some showing of knowledge
of illegality by analogy to subsection 2(f). 239 However, while the
Commission decisions purport to follow Automatic Canteen, its recent
decisions have raised substantial questions as to the right of a buyer
to initiate promotional requests.
In the Commission's earliest section 5 precedents, the emphasis
was properly placed on a showing that buyers were actually informed
of the illegality of promotions requested. No rule of caveat emptor
was adopted. For instance, in the Grand Union case, the Commission
cited Automatic Canteen as guiding precedent and carefully reviewed
the record evidence in concluding that the respondent had received
advertising allowances which it knew or should have known violated
section 2 (d). It emphasized that the discriminatory payments resulted
from a plan originated and implemented by the respondent, and that
the payments were actively solicited by the respondent, who sometimes
used pressure to encourage participation. 40 The amounts of the pay-
ments were unilaterally determined by the respondent and were not
designed for easy proportionalization. The payments were not nego-
tiated as part of current cooperative advertising plans and were gen-
erally outside such plans. In some instances, the respondent continued
to receive from the supplier an allowance under the announced adver-
tising program in addition to the special payments. In particular, the
Commission stressed that the respondents were informed that the sup-
pliers were not making payments on a proportionally equal basis to
competitors. 241
Again, in the American News Co. and Giant Food decisions, the
Commission emphasized coercive exaction of allowances and seller's
statements to the buyer that they could not proportionalize such pro-
motional payments in finding knowledge of illegality. "
289 See, e.g., Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960).
240 57 F.T.C. at 424.
241 57 F.T.C. at 425.
242 Giant Food, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 977, 993, 1009 (1961); American News Co., 58
F.T.C. 10, 26 (1961).
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However, in the Fred Meyer case,24 the Commission enunciated
a radically different test of knowledge, which on its face seems at
variance with these earlier precedents. There, the Commission noted
that merely by initiating a promotional scheme the buyer has sufficient
information to impose a duty upon him to inquire whether such pay-
ments are available on proportionally equal terms to its competitors.
Perhaps the most revealing passage in the whole opinion is a broad
expression of the view that "a powerful buyer does not go to seller
with hat in hand asking to be given something that is 'proportionately
equal' to what the smaller buyers are getting . . . . Of course,
Automatic Canteen expressly recognized the buyer's right to bargain
for such benefits without prejudgment of the question of knowledge.2 45
Perhaps a more realistic approach to the question of knowledge
and the Automatic Canteen ruling is found in the decision of Hearing
Examiner Walter Johnson in the Furr's case.246 Although recognizing
that the ruling was contrary to Automatic Canteen, that Examiner
followed the Fred Meyer doctrine that the buyer initiating a special
promotion automatically possesses himself of information which re-
quires him to affirmatively inquire of his sellers whether such payments
were being made available on proportionately equal terms to competi-
tors.247 Under such circumstances, he held that the respondent knew
or should have known that institutional payments it received from
suppliers in connection with a 1962 circus promotion were not being
made available to its competitors, because it had not discharged its
243 Fred Meyer, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. f1 16500 (July 9, 1963).
244 Ibid.
245 In Automatic Canteen, the record showed that the respondent had solicited
prices which it "knew were as much as 339 lower than prices quoted other purchasers,"
and did so "without inquiry of the seller, or assurance from the seller" of legality.
346 U.S. at 62-63. In both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court, the Commission
strenuously urged that under these facts Canteen had a duty of affirmative inquiry
and, indeed, the Seventh Circuit agreed and so held. 194 F.2d at 439. In the Supreme
Court, the Commission urged over and over that since Canteen initiated and affirmatively
induced lower prices it was automatically guilty. Its principal argument, as stated by
the Court, was that "buyers who through their own activities obtain a special price"
can be charged "with responsibility for whatever unlawful prices resuit." 346 U.S. at
71-72. (Emphasis added.) However phrased by the Commission, said the Court, this
argument must be rejected as it would render' the "knowingly" requirement meaningless;
"would comprehend any buyer who engages in bargaining over price"; would put "the
buyer at his peril whenever he engages in price bargaining"; and would adversely affect
"that sturdy bargaining between buyer and seller" and be inconsistent "with the broader
antitrust policies that have been laid down by Congress." Id. at 71-74.
246 Furr's Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. f1 17141 (November 27, 1964).
247 Id. at 22220.
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duty to investigate.24 However, the Examiner refused to enter a cease
and desist order against the respondent, noting that respondent had
acted under the advice of counsel given prior to the 1962 promotion,
that counsel had advised that respondent did not have an affirmative
duty to make inquiry as to the legality of promotional allowances, that
counsel had advised "that if any seller suggested that it could not pro-
portionalize its allowances" that respondent was to tell the supplier
that "we didn't want for them to participate at all." The Examiner
stressed:
Although this advice may be considered unsound judged by the
latest precedents of the Commission, it certainly cannot be said that
it was unsound as of the date that it was given or that it was other
than completely consistent and in accordance with Automatic Can-
teen. In this connection, it should be noted that Giant Food, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Commission, supra, which probably goes farthest in
the direction of adoption of the Commission's holdings in these types
of cases, was not decided until June 14, 1962, more than two months
after respondent's promotion in issue and long after the advice of
counsel was given to respondent in late 1961 and early 1962.249
Noting this showing of good faith, the Examiner concluded that "if
respondent was in fact in violation, such violation was inadvertent
without culpability and absent scienter."250 Thus, the Examiner's rul-
ing was fully in accord with Automatic Canteen.
On appeal, the Commission closed the proceeding without the
issuance of a cease and desist order, expressing its conviction that
"respondent will not again engage in the practice which is the subject
of the instant complaint .... , While no disposition of the knowl-
edge issue was necessary under this ruling, the Commission did indicate
its view, in broad and somewhat puzzling dicta, that respondent "knew
or should have known" that it was receiving allowances not available
to its competitors on proportionally equal terms. However, the most
interesting facet of the Furr's dicta is the fact that the Commission
did not adopt any broad rule that would require a buyer initiating a
special promotion to inquire into the proportionalization of payments.
Instead, the Commission cited Automatic Canteen favorably and in-
dicated that knowledge had been established by facts which were
"strikingly similar" to those proved in such earlier cases as Grand
Union, American News, and Giant. For instance, it noted that
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
251 Commission Opinion at 12 (October 20, 1965).
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some suppliers declined to participate [in the promotion] and ques-
tioned the legality of the plan.2 52
Arguably, the Commission's dicta on the factual aspects of the absence
of scienter may be subject to question in light of the Examiner's find-
ings and in light of the fact that the allowances at issue were institu-
tional in nature and had not been declared violative of section 2 (d) at
the time they were granted 23 Nevertheless, the Commission seems to
have taken a step forward in recognizing the necessity for a realistic
appraisal of actual knowledge by disavowing a test that imputes guilty
knowledge by the mere initiation of a special promotion.
CONCLUSION
Over a period of 26 years, the Federal Trade Commission's en-
forcement of the Robinson-Patman Act against buyers has created a
strange and checkered picture of prohibited acts and prohibited eco-
nomic consequences. There can be no question that the administrative
and judicial rulings in seller cases do not lay down concise rules of
seller liability which are readily understandable by the buyer in his
day-to-day operations. Questions pertaining to the status of integrated
purchasers and cooperatives continue to plague the buyer under sec-
tion 2(f). Questions pertaining to the meaning of such terms as "dis-
counts in lieu of brokerage," "purchase or sale," "services rendered,"
and the necessity for a showing of discriminatory treatment continue
to exist under section 2 (c). Likewise, the status of institutional allow-
ances and the resolution of the question of what purchasers actually
compete at a given functional level continue to pose problems in the
enforcement of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Faced with the question of evaluating the buyer's knowledge in this
complex. legal and marketing context, the Supreme Court directed in
the Automatic Canteen case that a realistic appraisal of the buyer's
actual knowledge must be made in order to preserve the competitive
benefit of the inherent right to bargain. The subsequent decisions of the
252 Id. at 10.
253 In broad and puzzling dicta, the Commission commented that "the proof need
not show that the buyer knew that the suppliers were violating Section 2(d) under
applicable law when they made the payments, but need only show that the buyer knew
or should have known the facts upon which the subsequent findings of illegality are
predicated-i.e., that the payments were not being offered or otherwise made available
to competitors on proportionally equal terms." Opinion at 11. While this dicta has
no precedential significance, it appears to be contrary to the Automatic Canteen require-
ment that the buyer must be shown to know that a preferential discount is "not within"
one of the seller's defenses. 346 U.S. at 74.
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Commission and of the courts appear to accord varying degrees of
recognition to the Supreme Court direction.
However, in large part, these decisions have failed to discuss the
heart of the dilemma created by the application of rigid standards
of knowledge to the buyer's activities, i.e., the competitive impact that
a rule of caveat emptor must have on the day-to-day activities of
buyers. The extent to which the courts and the Commission will con-
sider that impact is at best conjectural. It is sufficient to say that the
standards of knowledge, viewed against the fabric of viable competi-
tion, have been a source of disagreement at both the administrative
and judicial level. Perhaps the recent SCJ decision of the Federal
Trade Commission best emphasizes the diversity of opinion. In resolv-
ing the issue of knowledge, Commissioner MacIntyre, writing for the
majority, stressed the following factors:
The respondents organized SCJ for the purpose of securing price
concessions from their suppliers and their records show that they
knew they were getting a lower price than other jobbers not so
favorably situated.254
On the other hand, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman, who
finds that a showing of knowledge of illegality was not made, empha-
sizes that
Competition, in the antitrust sense, may be truly injured by a policy
of law enforcement which preserves intact an inefficient, uneconom-
ical and stratified system of distribution, and prevents the elimina-
tion of unnecessary middlemen costs . . . .25
A review of the Commission's enforcement patterns over the past
26 years does not afford a truly reliable indication of which of these
diverse views of competition will ultimately be followed. It is certainly
questionable whether the Commission's group cases in the automotive
replacement parts market have accomplished the promotion of com-
petition, inasmuch as they have tended to attribute sophisticated
knowledge to small buyers who do not deal face to face with manu-
facturers when they are buying through a group. Again, the suggestion
in section 5 cases that a buyer who initiates a special promotional pro-
gram is automatically charged with knowledge of illegality certainly
poses substantial questions from the standpoint of buyer competition.
On the other hand, it seems clear that neither the Commission nor the
courts have committed themselves to any rigid rule of caveat emptor.
For instance, the Commission's enforcement of section 2 (c) and
the court decisions interpreting 2 (c) show a realistic appraisal of the
254 Opinion at 15.
255 Dissenting Opinion at 15.
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practices which Congress sought to prohibit in 1963, i.e., the coercive
exaction of discriminatory prices by large buyers, which actually
injure competition. In 2(c), the courts in particular have given addi-
tional thought to the economic benefits of group buying, and the
services that particular individual buyers may render as grounds for
justifying so-called brokerage. This rejuvenation of section 2(c), as a
viable statute aimed at competitive inequality, is probably the most
helpful development in the pattern of enforcement of buyer's liability
in recent years. Hopefully such standards will also be applied in
other buyer cases.
